

HOMELAND SECURITY BY THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY: ARE POLITICAL OPPONENTS INTERNAL ENEMIES?

Enio Viterbo Martins

INTRODUCTION:

Historical context

With the end of Getúlio's dictatorship, the control of the political police of the Federal District, which for years was dominated by one of the military men in the army: Filinto Muller, continued to be important for presidents since this redemocratization. Thus, the relationship of the army with the political police and public security secretariats by the State were deepened by the rise of the “Doctrine Góes”, which combined with the doctrines of “National Security” and “Revolutionary War”, militarized Public Security in Brazil.

These doctrines were based on combating communism and led to the politicization of the Armed Forces. However, how can we perceive this militarization and what were the political consequences in military civil relations?

Methods

As a method of research, we used the analysis of the documentation of the “Conselho de Segurança Nacional” - National Security Council (NSC), an advisory body to the President of the Republic that was basically made up of military personnel, to answer what was the relationship and consequence of the relationship between the Armed Forces and the public security organs. We also made a brief note about the soldiers who participated in the leadership of three institutions: the police, the NSC and the army. As a period of the research, we selected episodes that involved “subversive activities” in governments between the Vargas dictatorship and the 1964 military dictatorship: Dutra; JK; Jânio and Goulart.

Hypothesis

Our hypothesis is that the anti-communism that founded this relationship became so strong in the Armed Forces. They started to see the communists as internal enemies, which were trying to overthrow the central government through a "revolutionary war". Such foundations were finally used as a base for the overthrow of João Goulart and helped to create the repressive system of the Military Dictatorship.

The Goes Doctrine and the National Security Council

Góes Monteiro became the main intellectual of the Army from 1934, when he formulated a doctrine that involved national security, economic development and modernization of the Armed Forces, which was later called "Góes Doctrine". This doctrine was transmitted in the work written by the general himself called "The Revolution of 1930 and the political purpose of the Army" of 1934. According to the general himself:

(...)it used to be preached that the Army should not be political - tricky euphemism to prevent or not prevent, according to the conveniences and selfishness of groups, the military to take an active part in facile or even opinion competitions.

But it was a mistake, an absurdity - the result of ignorance, bad faith or misunderstanding in history. The Army is an essentially political body; and he is interested, fundamentally, in all aspects, in the truly national policy, from which, to a certain extent, the doctrine and the potential of war emanate. The general policy. Economic policy, industrial and agricultural policy, the communications system, international politics, all branches of activity, production and collective existence, including the education and education of the people, the political and social regime - everything, in short affects a country's military policy.¹(sic)

By involving the Army in national politics and placing it as the north of the country's development, the Góes Doctrine, in addition to ending up militarizing society, also expressed that the policy developed by the Army should not be partisan, but a developmentalist militaristic policy, which was expressed in his famous phrase "Alias, being the Army an essentially political instrument, the collective conscience must be created in the sense of making the Army's policy and not policy in the Army"².

¹ GÓES MONTEIRO, Pedro Aurélio de. A Revolução de 30 e a finalidade política do exercito: esboço histórico. Rio de Janeiro, Adersen, 1934. p. 133.

² GÓES MONTEIRO, Pedro Aurélio de. Op. Cit. p. 163.

If, on the one hand, this army policy was supraparty, on the other hand it also qualified as much as anti-Marxist, which opened the possibility for Vargas' political police during the 1930s to pursue both civilians and even active-duty soldiers whom were identified with communist ideology.

O Exército não pôde baixar ao nível de fações políticas interesseiras, e, disso decorre a necessidade de permanecer dentro de um mesmo espírito diretor — expressão vivente de todo o idealismo nacional, a cujo influxo devem organizar-se e orientar-se todos os grupos e classes sociais.

The Army should not fall to the level of interested political factions, and, as a result, the need to remain within the same director spirit - a living expression of all national idealism, to should influence all groups and social classes, and organizations must be organized and oriented. Social classes³ (sic)

It should be said that when Góes Monteiro referred to the role of the Armed Forces in Brazil's national security, he put them on the defense as much as external enemies as they did internal enemies. The fact that the army was given the role of defense against internal enemies put it, in theory, against political, or ideological, internal positions that have been interpreted against “national interests” or against “national security”. The practical consequence was the need to combat subversive internal enemies against the central government.

The Army and the Navy are, therefore, the maximum responsible for the internal and external security of the nation, needing for that purpose to be evidently as strong as possible, so that no other element antagonistic to their purpose can threaten the foundations of the nation.⁴ (sic)

Brief evolution of the National Security Council

The National Security Council was modified in 1942, through Decree-Law No. 5,163, of December 31st, in 1942, the General Secretariat of the National Security Council drafted the regulations of the Council itself, covering the organization: of the

³ Ibidem, p. 138.

⁴ Ibidem, p. 156.

National Security Council; the General Secretariat; of the Studies Commission and Security Sections of civil Ministries.

Throughout the “Estado Novo”, the National Security Council met on six occasions: 1937, 1939, 1940 (through written consultation, without actual meeting), and twice in 1942.

FINDINGS

Government OF Eurico Gaspar Dutra . Military - Federal District Police - National Security.

Eurico Gaspar Dutra was elected President of the Republic by the Social Democratic Party for the years 1946-1951 and already modified in his initial year of government the General Secretariat of the Council that became responsible, through Decree-Law No. 9,975-A of 1946 for the organization and direction of a “Federal Information and Counter-Information Service”. It was the first attempt to create a federal agency of national character for information.

The new constitutional charter, promulgated during the Dutra government, assigned a central role to the National Security Council, contained in article 179 of the new constitutional charter that the “Problems related to the defense of the country will be studied by the National Security Council and the organs special forces of the armed forces, in charge of preparing them for mobilization and military operations. ”. Such a device, due to its scope, gave great prominence, powers and competence to the NSC.

In 1949, the “National Security” started to be implemented in public security organs in such a way that the collaboration between them were extended from the Department of Political and Social Order (DOPS), through the civil police stations and battalions of the Military Police , up to NSC.

The Director of DOPS in São Paulo himself sent a report to NSC on communist activities in that state, reporting activities where militants were supposed to use revolutionary tactics to try to achieve their goals. Among the clashes between the communists and the NS apparatus, we highlight:

- 20/03/1949 – City: Santo Anastácio. When local communists hold an event called the “Peasant Zone Congress”, which had been banned by the

government, the police go to the scene to end the event and are received by gunfire by those present. On this fight a corporal from the São Paulo Public Force was killed, a sergeant from the local detachment was injured and minor injuries to a police investigator. Five members of the congress were injured. 23/06/1949 – City: Fernandópolis. After allegedly assaulting the village of Populina, where they looted residences and commercial establishments, local communist leaders went to the municipality's headquarters, with the aim of, allied with other armed groups, taking the city by storm. There was a plan to loot the city hall, rob bank branches and occupy the local police station⁵

- 07/09/1949 – City: Baurú. Communist leaders marked railroad rallies “for peace and social welfare”. Rallies were banned by police authorities and were forcibly dissolved.
- 12/09/1949 – Capital of São Paulo. The direction of “Republic Pictures” would have been threatened by communist elements to show the film “Red March”.

Also in 1949, studies on “National Security” started to be deepened and systematized theoretically by the “Escola Superior de Guerra” - Superior School of War (SSW), an organ created that year, and by the Estado Maior do Exército - Army's General Staff.

JUSCELINO GOVERNMENT - NSC GROWS

In Juscelino's government, 1956-1961, we can see an increase in the activities of NSC's members in combating “subversive” activities. The military linked to the council continued to have relations with the police forces and frequently activated other organs of the federal government indicating that the subversive activities, which would be carried out by “communists”.

In 1956, Juscelino appointed Felisberto Batista Teixeira to take over as head of police for the Federal District in the place of General Augusto Magessi, who had resigned

⁵ Voz Operária, 23 de julho de 1949, p. 11. O jornal, de orientação marxista, afirmava que se tratava da luta de camponeses contra o latifúndio. Destacava ainda que os camponeses “ocupam as terras do latifúndio com armas na mão”, p.1.

because he had ordered, against the president's will, the arrest of journalists and the seizure of copies of the magazine "Maquis", a press agency opposed to the president.

The following year, in May 1957, JK appointed General Amauri Krueel as chief of police of the DFSP, replacing General Batista Teixeira. Krueel remained in office until June 1959, when he had to resign an assault on Deputy Meneses Cortes. The deputy participated in a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry that investigated acts of corruption by the Federal Department of Public Security.

In the presidential message to the Congress of 1958, Juscelino attested to the importance of the National Security Council and expressly highlighted the General Secretariat of the National Security Council, describing it as an essential organ in the formation of the country's National Security policy and of advice from the Chief Executive.

In June 1959, the president appointed Crisanto de Figueiredo, who had been chief of staff to the general secretary of the National Security Council in early June 1958 to replace Army general Amauri Krueel as chief of police for the Federal District. Crisanto appointed Army Colonel Luís França de Oliveira as the head of the Political Police. França had also served in the General Secretariat of the National Security Council from late November 1955 until 1957, when he was discharged.

The military continued with the study of topics related to "National Security". At the Superior School of War, studies on the "Revolutionary War" identified it as a communist maneuver, through which the communists would take over the country. They would use subversive, psychological and destabilizing activities of the Armed Forces to achieve success.

At the end of 1959, the conservative military believed that the scenario for this "Revolutionary War" seemed to be being put into practice. Admiral Pena Boto had publicly warned that a communist-military coup was in preparation to prevent the election that would come in 1960. More than that, the admiral also denounced communist participation in the Army: "for the revolutionary phase the CP actively prepares the supporters that has infiltrated the Armed Forces, notably the Army. "

On December 11 of that year, the federal government became aware of two military uprisings that would take place before Christmas 1959 and the other in April of the following year. Such uprisings were being monitored by different intelligence agencies: the Army's Secret Service; the National Security Council and the DFSP Political Police Department.

The Minister of Justice attended the National Congress to denounce that one of the military uprisings that occurred in that period, the “Aragarças revolt”, was intended to implant a revolutionary government system “in the Fidel Castro model” in Brazil. Subsequently, on December 14, the Secretary General of NSC, General Nelson de Melo, sent an official letter to the Minister expressly requesting measures against the communists: “I ask you. to examine the possibility of applying measures that were deemed necessary to prevent communist or subversive elements from continuing to promote agitations that disrupt the life of the country and affect its security.”⁶.

The situation worsened even in November 1960, when the military believed they were facing a movement that used mechanisms of Revolutionary War. A strike by railroad workers, seafarers and port workers broke out in Rio de Janeiro, who sought, since they were civil servants, to match the increase in their wages equal to what had been granted to the military.

The “Strike of Parity”, as it became known, was declared illegal right at the beginning by the government on suspicion of communist influence, with several conflicts between police / army troops and strikers. 12,000 police officers were mobilized who arrested more than 100 strike workers, including union leaders linked to the Communist Party.

Until the early 1960s, there was a clear effort by the political police to characterize the close connection of workers' entities and movements with what in their view is the cunning machinations of the Communists, always faithfully following Moscow guidelines..⁷

The threat felt by the military to National Security due to the Parity Strike was so great that, to end it, the military ministers advised President JK to declare a State of Siege in the country; the request was not presented to Congress at the end of the strike. There were even suspicions that a military movement was underway that even sought to suppress Congress, the headline of *Jornal do Brasil* of November 15, 1960 was "Military wanted dictatorship against strike". In December, in an internal army report on the union situation in the country, the military expressly identified Revolutionary War tactics in the labor movement.

(...)

3 - The railroad workers of PERNAMBUCO and RIO decided to show revulsion to the strike punters, and honors to the arrested agitators. We

⁶ Ofício Secreto, nº 29-2S/3235/59, 14 de dezembro de 1959.

⁷ Marcelo Badaró Mattos, Greves, sindicatos e repressão policial no Rio de Janeiro (1954-1964). Revista Brasileira de História. São Paulo, v. 24, nº 47, p.241-70 – 2004, p. 260.

think that the lynching suffered by LEOPOLDINA workers is of the greatest gravity. It is a way of establishing SELECTIVE TERROR, which fits within the pressure techniques of REVOLUTIONARY WAR.⁸

Even in December of that year, the military leadership believed that the strike faced was a threat to democracy and that the right to strike should be regulated "in the best interests of national security.", demonstrating the growth of militarism that the National Security ideology tried to impose on society.

Government Janio - Contingency plans and National Security

President Jânio Quadros (1961), began to supervise the actions of the previous administration through investigations and inquiries. The president has often placed those responsible for these military investigations linked to insubordination movements during the JK government. According to Felipe Loureiro: "In addition, the presence of military personnel in the heads of the syndicates - many of whom were involved in coup episodes during the JK Government - generated greater tensions"⁹.

Ernesto Geisel (head of the general secretary of the NSC from May 1946 until April 1947), brother of the minister, was appointed by Jânio military commander of Brasília, Ernesto was also a member of SSW since 1952. Ernesto's brother, Orlando Geisel, was member of the General Staff of the Minister of War.

Once Jânio's office was set up, General Golbery was responsible for leading the office of the general secretary of the National Security Council, through which he set up a surveillance and intelligence structure that would later be replicated in the National Intelligence Service. Having formed the president's military cabinet with soldiers linked to the Superior School of War, and consequently with the doctrines of National Security and Revolutionary War, the National Security Council started to analyze the national policy frameworks and form in-depth analyzes of the national situation, which expressed through documents called "Situation Estimation".

In April, NSC prepared Situation Estimate No. 2, in which we can see several aspects, both ideological and corresponding to the doctrines that were being studied at "ACSS" and "SSW". The document detailed that the communists, together with the

⁸ OF. Reservado nº 1177 – Gab/11532/60. ASSUNTO: Informes Correntes sobre os diferentes Estados e Territórios brasileiros,

⁹ Ibidem. P.192.

opposition of the PSD-PTB and military elements would take certain actions against the government, among which:

- erode the authority of the government, forcing it to retreat or concessions in certain sectors (question of the timetable for public service; gratification of doctors, dentists and engineers);

- vehemently denounce alleged dictatorial tendencies of the Federal Executive, seeking to make it incompatible with Congress and State Governments;

(...)

- create a climate of uneasiness, spreading alarmist news of cuts in salaries (in particular in the Armed Forces) and of general price increases (attributed to acts or omissions by the Government);

- take full advantage of the tolerance with the inter-union pacts, aiming at the creation of a Union Central under its control;¹⁰

It can be observed that the military leadership also demonstrated that it monitored the disgruntled sectors of the Armed Forces, and according to the diagnosis it made of the country's political problems, this "Situation Estimate" came to the conclusion that a repressive system would be necessary to guarantee security. country public.

2- CONCLUSIONS.

(...)

without prejudice to any preventive measures aimed at reducing the intensity of the crisis - clarification of public opinion, removal of disturbing elements that still occupy key positions, economic and other measures - structure a repressive system capable of acting efficiently and promptly, even causing the most dangerous manifestations to be aborted, either in cities or in rural areas. (Emphasis added)

Subsequently, the National Security Council and the Armed Forces General Staff organized the "Governmental SI-1 Guidelines" for internal security, which already foresaw "a serious period of social unrest, with possible serious disturbances of the internal order." . Even, according to the document, these "unrest" could generate an insurrectionary war:

3- Variant:

¹⁰ Ofício Ultra Secreto nº 188 – Gab/4230/61 de 03 de abril de 1961. p.2-3.

Agitations in the military environment (Army, Navy, Air Force, State Police Forces), characterized by successive individual pronouncements with manifestations of solidarity, memorials of officers or squares and manifestos of the clubs in the class, which may lead to acts of collective indiscipline and even upheaval in units.¹¹

In “Situation Estimate” n°4, dated June 1961, it was categorically stated that the “nationalists” (identified by the conservative military as left wing) were a group in permanent “agitation”. Such a position denotes that the group linked to President Jânio Quadros was much closer to the conservative sector than to those military members more closely linked to the left.

The Superior School of War also deepened its studies on the theme of “subversive” activities. We identified this continuity through the study “Conceptualization of Insurrectional War; Revolutionary War; Subversion (Subversive War); Psychological Action; Psychological War and Cold War”, of June 1961.

MILITARY NAMES INVOLVED IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT POLICE AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

	Federal District Police Chief	Army position	Period in the NSC
Antônio José de Lima Câmara	Dez 1946 – 1951.	general	
Ciro Riopardense de Resende	Fev 1951 – Ago 1954	general	
Geraldo de Meneses Cortes	1954 – Nov 1955	Lieutenant Colonel	1946 - 1951.
Augusto Magessi	Set - 1956	general	
Felisberto Batista Teixeira	Set 1956 – May 1957	general	1947 – March 1954
Amauri Krueel	May 1957 – Jun 1959	general	
Crisanto de Figueiredo	Jun 1959 – Nov 1959	coronel	1958

¹¹ Ibidem, p.2

Luís Inácio Jaques Júnior	Nov 1959 –	Coronel	
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Joao Goulart - The Revolutionary War and the breakdown of hierarchy and discipline.

João Goulart (1961-1964) appointed, in 1962, General Néelson de Melo (chief of police of the federal district in 1944) as Minister of War on July 15 of that year. Melo was replaced on September 18, 1962 by General Amauri KrueI, who remained in office until January 15, 1963. General KrueI, a close friend of Goulart and considered a legalist, was considered anti-communist and often the political forces of the left pressured the president to replace him.

From the point of view of public / national security, “subversive” activities also continued during Goulart's government. In January 1962, a terrorist attack was carried out, supposedly, by far-right agents at the headquarters of the National Union of Students in Rio de Janeiro and at Radio Farroupilha, in Porto Alegre, including .38 caliber revolvers provided by the “Union of Patriotic Anticommunists” ¹².

The issue soon became a national security problem, with the Minister of War calling for an investigation to be carried out to see if military elements are involved among the terrorists. Concerned about national security, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Francisco Clementino de San Tiago Dantas, together with the then Secretary General of the National Security Council, General Amaury KrueI, determined the creation of a “secret service” that worked together to the National Security Council itself. This new body aimed to combat illegal or subversive actions by agents or employees of the many diplomatic representations of communist countries that were in Brazil.¹³

Little known, this group was called “Special Operations Group” and started its activities in 1962 with financial resources provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and human resources provided by the General Secretariat of NSC and the Federal Department of Public Security, donating devices and materials by embassies of countries aligned to Brazil¹⁴.

¹² *Última hora*, 8 de janeiro de 1962, p.4

¹³ Ofício Ultra Secreto, nº 007 – Gab/4011/64 de 16 de janeiro de 1964.

¹⁴ *Idem*.

At that time, many social movements continued to be classified as “subversives”. The Chief of Staff of the General Secretariat of the National Security Council informed the Secretary General of the National Security Council about the issue of subversion within the labor movement and the possible risk to the president's authority by strengthening such workers' associations:

It should be emphasized that several unions are already very infiltrated - if not dominated at all - by subversive elements, which, precisely, are the ones that are most active in the organization of such union associations not provided for in our laws.

On the other hand, there would be no need to resort to examples - the last general strike, although partly unsuccessful, and Santos' recent strike, in solidarity with petrochemical workers, are frightening examples! - to assess the danger that, for the security of the country and the people, a Union Central of national character and even, although to a lesser extent, the existing Inter-Union Pacts would represent.

For if, today, in general, such associations support President JOÃO GOULART, it is not impossible that the ambition of a determined labor group or of some eventually strong leader, will lead to a challenge to the authority of the President, threatening to paralyze the nation. The same can happen if a group interested in subversion infiltrates the summit of these Inter-Union Pacts, which could lead the country to a serious internal upheaval.¹⁵

The military also continued researching the doctrine of the "Revolutionary War" that year, with the South Defense Zone Command Center, subordinate organ of the Armed Forces Staff, carried out a study called "National Security in the face of the Revolutionary War". In the same vein, the North Defense Zone Command Nucleus, also subordinate to the Armed Forces General Staff, carried out the “Representation in the Maneuver of the IV Army Staff on revolutionary war and preparation of the corresponding report”, from which we can see that the military was even preparing with maneuvers for a possible war against subversion¹⁶.

In August 1962 Jango received a tribute and a public statement of support at the Air Force's Noncommissioned Officers and Sergeants Club by about eight thousand noncommissioned officers, lieutenants and sergeants from the Armed Forces, the Military Police and the Guanabara Fire Department, where they also attended General Osvino

¹⁵ Ofício CONFIDENCIAL nº 12 -2S/2109/62. Rio de Janeiro, GB. 12 de Julho de 1962.

¹⁶ Relatório das Atividades do Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas, exemplar nº 2, ARQUIVO NACIONAL, p. 49.

Ferreira Alves, Augusto Magessi, Admiral Candido Aragão, Nelson de Melo, Amaury Kruel, Henrique Teixeira Lott, among others¹⁷.

NSC did not abandon the concern for National Security that year and one of the targets of anti-communist concern was a representative of communism in Brazil, the Cuban ambassador. As the military believed that the ambassador would be encouraging the masses to rebel against the government, they recommended the expulsion of the Cuban representative to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Stressing that the general secretary of the NSC in this period was General Amaury Kruel.

For these reasons, the General Secretariat of the National Security Council considers the permanence of the Cuban Ambassador, Hon. JOAQUIM HERNANDES ARMAS in Brazil, inconvenient from the point of view of National Security and suggests to Your Excellency your removal as soon as possible.¹⁸

It is also necessary to transcribe part of the document "OF / reserved nº 67-Gab / 1116/62", of July 30, 1962, in which General Kruel, Secretary General of the National Security Council, affirms to the then Minister of Foreign Affairs what:

Soon after the resumption of relations between Brazil and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Francisco Clementino San Tiago Dantas, felt the need for preventive measures to be taken against possible illegal or subversive actions, which could be developed by agents or employees belonging to the new diplomatic establishments, which, by virtue of the act, would be installed in our country. As a result, the former holder of this portfolio requested the cooperation of the National Security Council, which was responsible for intercepting clandestine information.¹⁹

Later, in 1963, Carlos Lacerda, governor of Guanabara, became one of the main bulwarks against communism and the “subversion” that would occur in the country because of the Goulart government. Military personnel such as Cordeiro de Farias, Ernesto Geisel, Orlando Geisel and Silvio Heck reportedly signed a manifesto earlier that

¹⁷ Última hora, 27 de agosto de 1962, p.4.

¹⁸ OFÍCIO RESERVADO. Nº 80 – Gab/113/62. Rio de Janeiro. 3 de Setembro de 1962. Assunto: Atividades de Embaixador de Cuba no Brasil.

¹⁹ OF/reservado nº 67-Gab/1116/62. Disponível em:

http://sian.an.gov.br/sianex/Consulta/Pesquisa_Livre_Painel_Resultado.asp?v_CodReferencia_id=1125912&v_aba=1. Acesso em: 04 de Set de 2018.

year, in which they supported Lacerda in the episode of the murders of beggars by officials linked to the police²⁰.

In June 1963, General Antonio Carlos da Silva Murici said: “the state of siege is imposed in Brazil, because the country is in a revolutionary war.” . Murici was commander of the garrison of the Natal Army and subordinated to Castelo Branco, then head of the IV army, which had already gone through both SSW and the “Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército”- Army Command and Staff School (ACSS).

In August of this year, the Armed Forces General Staff produced a document, called “War Conception”²¹, to the military summit, which was addressed to senior military officers, and, supposedly, to the very office of the Presidency of the Republic²². This is a publication resulting from a joint effort by the Army, Navy and Air Force that, through a study group, presented different concepts of war. Among the concepts was that of the "Revolutionary War". The document also described what position should be taken by Brazil in case this conflict does occur:

1.1.4 – Revolutionary War.

This War, whose stage of subversion, in Brazil, is in an evolutionary process, presents as main agents the sympathizers of communist ideology in national territory, encouraged and, perhaps, aided by the countries of the Communist Bloc.

Its transition to the revolutionary stage itself may occur if legal measures are not being taken against subversive action, in particular, those related to national weaknesses in the economic, political and social fields, which can be exploited. If, however, it reaches this revolutionary stage, it will have an irregular aspect, which may evolve to the conventional form, causing, in any case, losses that may culminate, with its aggravation, compromising national unity.

(...)

In this War the general national attitude will be offensive in order to neutralize or cancel the revolutionary action.²³

²⁰ *Jornal do Brasil*, 24 de fevereiro de 1963.

²¹ ESTADO-MAIOR DAS FORÇAS ARMADAS. VERSÃO PROPOSTA PELOS SENHORES SUB-CHEFES EXÉRCITO E AERONÁUTICA-EMFA-PARA A "Concepção DE GUERRA". Exemplar nº1, 1963.

²² Como existia a suspeita de que o próprio presidente estaria envolvido em articulações para desestabilizar a hierarquia das Forças Armadas é improvável que o documento tenha chegado de fato ao gabinete presidencial, porém como o Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas era subordinado a própria presidência da República, tal hipótese resta nebulosa.

²³ *Ibidem*, p.7-8.

The Brazilian strategy in the event of the Revolutionary War was outlined. It would be necessary to: 1) intensify internal security measures; 2) occupation of areas disturbed by revolutionary action and 3) limitation and reduction of areas liberated as a result of revolutionary action.²⁴

Having defeated the sergeants' movement in October 1963, Carlos Lacerda gave an interview to an American newspaper in which he criticized the federal government, which caused indignation to the president and the military that supported him.

The interview led to the episode of the attempted arrest of the governor by army forces. It is not known exactly how President João Goulart was involved in this case, however, there are documents that show that the order would have come from the Minister of War himself²⁵. The governor's arrest was not made due to the fact that some military personnel in charge of the operation questioned the legality of the measure.

The balance of forces between the various military sectors was so great that there was, in fact, an impasse. Those who supported Jango and those who planned to overthrow him apparently had the same military strength. The *Jornal do Brasil* reported on October 1, 1963:

The balance of forces, in the opinion of the military sectors considered "progressive", prevents any of the ideological groups that are currently clashing in Brazil, to be successful in any movement outside the constitutional framework. (...) A senior military rank, currently without command, said that the restlessness reigning in the barracks is obviously due to the national unrest itself (...).²⁶

At the same time as Lacerda's attempted arrest, the government sent Congress a request for a State of Siege across the country, based on: an alleged conspiracy by Lacerda and Ademar de Barros, on the danger of strikes, which would also have the intention to disrupt Goulart's governance and the internal divisions that permeated both military institutions and military police.

Despite the apparent strength of the President's "military device", support for the State of Siege collapsed, as both the unions and the governors of the situation and the

²⁴ Ibidem, anexo III, p.8-9.

²⁵ Disponível em: <http://arquivosdaditadura.com.br/documento/galeria/jango-planejou-sequestrar-carlos-lacerda#pagina-3>. Acesso em 10 de Janeiro de 2018.

²⁶ *Jornal do Brasil*, 1 de outubro de 1963, p.5.

opposition rejected the measure. Even Luís Carlos Prestes, the most famous communist leader, was in favor of the measure²⁷.

Jango, in the president's annual message to Congress, demonstrated that even in 1964, almost 30 years after the promulgation of the doctrines of Góes Monteiro, that the concept of National Security was still coupled with economic development, highlighting the role of the National Security Council and its leadership role in national defense:

The true concept of national security transcends the military plan and is located in the very structure of a social, political and economic complex, which really represents National Power. Military power, part of this complex, is integrated into the whole, which has its highest form of coordination and direction in the National Security Council, with the Armed Forces General Staff (EMFA) being responsible for jointly preparing jobs. , of the three forces, which in turn have their executive expression in the Ministries of the Navy, War and Air Force.²⁸

In January 1964, the revolutionary war speech reached opposition politicians, who accused the federal government of being involved in communist activities. We can see that for the president of the UDN, Deputy Olavo Bilac Pinto, Goulart was being used by the communists in his revolutionary war. In an interview given by the deputy to *Jornal do Brasil* on February 9, 1964, the deputy did not rate Goulart as a communist or socialist, but placed him as an instrument in the gears of the “revolutionary war”.

If he responds to my suggestion - he affirmed - the President of the Republic will be able to learn personally about the mechanism of revolutionary war: about the various phases of its development; about the techniques of psychological warfare used by communists to destroy the social, economic and legal order of a country (...) President João Goulart - said Mr. Bilac Pinto - who has always been used, successfully and without risks, of the support of communists in their political life, they have not yet realized that, at the moment, they are being used by them to accelerate the revolutionary war in the country, aiming to make us a Soviet satellite.²⁹

In this sense, the general Hugo de Andrade Abreu published an article entitled “Revolutionary War” in the journal *Synthesis of Economic and Social Policy*, nº 21, from January-March 1964, where we can see an example of the military who studied the

²⁷ Tribuna da imprensa, 5/6 de outubro de 1963, p.2.

²⁸ MENSAGEM AO CONGRESSO NACIONAL, REMETIDA PELO PRESIDENTE DA REPÚBLICA NA ABERTURA DA SESSÃO LEGISLATIVA DE 1964. P. 10.

²⁹ Jornal do Brasil, 9 de fevereiro de 1964, p.3.

revolutionary war in SSW or ACSS and who identified the breach of hierarchy in the armed forces as a preparation for such a war:

One of the immediate objectives of these attacks is to take action on the armed forces in order to weaken their hierarchical structure and spirit of discipline in them. This is because the unmined armed forces may become a serious obstacle in the last phase of the revolutionary war, when it comes to moving to military action.³⁰

On March 20, General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, then head of the Army's General Staff, distributed an internal manifesto in which he warned of the closure of Congress through a revolutionary process and the possibility of a Goulart dictatorship. For Hélio Silva, the manifestation of Castelo Branco was of paramount importance:

General Humberto Castelo Branco's position was of the utmost importance, Chief of Staff of the Army and, consequently, the second authority in the military hierarchy, he was still, at that time, depository of the confidence of the President of the Republic and the Minister of War. For this reason, in the official media, his pronouncement made a strong impression, but it was admitted, despite the harshness of his concepts, as a touch of gathering and a warning sign. In conspiracy circles, however, the chief of staff was already seen as the pole of the movement and the catalyst for the various preparatory movements. Thus, his speech was taken as a sign that the revolution was going to be unleashed.³¹

Thus, for conservative military leaders, as well as for civilian conspiring opposition politicians such as the UDN president, Bilac Pinto, Jango would be involved in the Armed Forces uprising to prepare for an alleged “revolutionary war”.

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³⁰LYRA TAVARES, Aurélio de. *Guerra Revolucionária*. SÍNTESE POLÍTICA ECONÔMICA SOCIAL. V. 6, N. 21 (1964), p. 8-23.

³¹SILVA, Hélio. Op. Cit, p.258

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