

**Delegitimize to demilitarize:
Civilian control of the Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro**

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Abstract (145 words): How can civilians control militarization? Latin American politicians increasingly deploy soldiers for domestic crimefighting, which risks delegitimizing democracies' security policies. I argue that delegitimization is not only a possible consequence but, also, a means of controlling this phenomenon's risk. By discursively constructing and rendering, through public debate, soldiers' crimefighting deployment as inappropriate for democracy and ineffective for security, civilian actors can gain leverage over this intensifying trend in a way that enables demilitarization, or the armed forces' withdrawal from crimefighting deployments. The dilemma is that enabling demilitarization through discursive delegitimization is conditional on politicians compensating the armed forces with power in other political decision-making areas. I illustrate this argument by examining its observable implications with respect to media coverage of civilian monitoring institutions and the sequencing of delegitimization, demilitarization, and compensation in the context of the Brazilian Army's 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro.

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Introduction

How can civilians control militarization? Latin American politicians increasingly deploy soldiers domestically to complement police in crimefighting. Most acutely in Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru, such “militarization of law enforcement” or “police-ization of the armed forces” (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2019) is risky in two main respects. First, militarization risks rendering Latin American democracies’ security policies illegitimate. Latin American democracies’ intensifying militarization stems from politicians’ electoral incentives to appear tough on crime amidst deepening public insecurity. Nonetheless, militarization is inappropriate for Latin American democracies because it risks increasing armed forces’ political power at the expense of civilian authority. Militarization also is ineffective for crimefighting because it risks exacerbating state and non-state violence and discouraging politicians from police agencies whose corruption and inefficacy enabled militarization in the first place (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2019). Second, these very causes and effects make militarization path dependent, or difficult to disrupt and likely to continue indefinitely once underway (see Croissant et al. 2011). This is because militarization risks exacerbating insecurity, thus deepening politicians’ electoral incentives to deploy soldiers for crimefighting, and risks empowering the military, thus deepening the armed forces’ institutional incentives to engage in crimefighting. As path-dependent delegitimization of security policies threatens to jeopardize political stability in Latin America by perpetually exacerbating violence and undermining democratic norms, it is urgent to understand how pro-democracy, pro-peace civilian actors can reduce these risks by controlling militarization.

I argue that the delegitimization of security policy is not only a potential consequence of militarization but, also, a potential means of controlling this risky phenomenon. By discursively constructing and rendering, through public debate, soldiers’ crimefighting deployment as inappropriate for democracy and ineffective for security, civilian actors can gain leverage over this intensifying trend in a way that enables *demilitarization*, or the armed forces’ indefinite withdrawal from crimefighting deployments (see Levy 2016). However, civilians’ ability to enable demilitarization through delegitimization may be conditional on politicians compensating the armed forces by expanding military power within other political areas. Controlling militarization, in other words, may not mean controlling the military. This is because militarization constitutes power within the internal security decision-making area, which the armed forces are reluctant to yield unless politicians offset this loss by granting power in other decision-making areas. Theoretically speaking, my argument implies that, while delegitimizing militarization enables militarization, it introduces a difficult trade-off that reveals military power’s stickiness and democracy’s fragility. Empirically speaking, my argument offers several observable implications. First, civilian actors that attempt to control militarization through discursive demilitarization should garner more robust media coverage than civilian actors that do not attempt to do so. Second, civilian actors’ discursive delegitimization of militarization should precede demilitarization absent other local factors that could explain the armed forces’ withdrawal from crimefighting deployments. Third, the armed forces should accrue or should appear on the cusp of accruing power within other areas of national politics before withdrawing.

With this paper, I illustrate my argument’s internal validity by demonstrating that these three observable implications hold in the context of the Brazilian Army’s 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro, an elucidative instance of Latin America’s militarization. I begin by developing

the argument based on Levy's (2016) framework of controlling militarization through discursive delegitimization. Next, I elaborate this argument's observable implications, including four hypotheses associated with the first observable implication regarding media coverage. I then briefly introduce the Federal Intervention context. Regarding the first observable implication, I detail my methodology and present the case of the Rio de Janeiro-based NGO *Intervention Observatory* as an illustration that discursive delegitimization is necessary and sufficient for civilian institutions aimed at controlling militarization to garner robust media coverage. Regarding the second observable implication, I describe the Federal Intervention's puzzling conclusion and provide original interview data about how the Federal Intervention's delegitimization preceded Rio de Janeiro's demilitarization. Regarding the third observable implication, I describe how the Brazilian Army's accrual of power within other arenas of national politics preceded its withdrawal from crimefighting in Rio de Janeiro. I then conclude briefly by discussing my argument's external validity and opportunities for continued research.

Argument: Civilian control of militarization through discursive delegitimization

The conventional wisdom is that cultivating civilian control in Latin American democracies requires limiting the military's *power*, or its institutional autonomy and political influence (Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017, 77-84). In this perspective, *civilian control of the military* means non-military actors or "civilians having exclusive authority to decide on national policies and their implementation" (Croissant et al. 2011, 78), including the ability to delegate such authority to the armed forces and penalize the armed forces for non-compliance. A country's democratic governance becomes more consolidated as civilian control of the military increases across five decision-making areas: elections; public policy; internal security; external defense; and military organization (77-79). Within these areas, civilian "change agents" (Croissant et al. 2011, 83), or political principals and bureaucratic agents intent on disrupting the path-dependent status quo of military power, have several mechanisms to cultivate control: power-related mechanisms like sanctioning, counterbalancing, and monitoring that "coerce the military into complying with newly introduced rules" (85-86); legitimacy-related mechanisms that "nurture military compliance with institutional change by transforming the normative framework of the armed forces" (87) like selecting military members based on criteria that may enable control and socializing them to democratic norms; and compensation-related mechanisms that grant military privileges in some areas in exchange for control elsewhere, like appeasing demands, conceding autonomy, and fostering public support (87-88). Power-related mechanisms, in this perspective, are most impactful because they "involve the threat or use of coercion and intrude deeply into the military organization" (89). Legitimacy-related mechanisms are less impactful because they intrude without coercing. Compensation-related mechanisms are least impactful because they neither intrude nor coerce. If we considered limiting militarization's risks dependent on controlling the armed forces, we therefore would prioritize analyzing efforts based on power-related mechanisms for understanding how civilians can control militarization in Latin America.

Once we distinguish controlling the military from controlling militarization, however, we see that the latter depends more on legitimacy-related mechanisms and that the former perspective (Croissant et al. 2011) suggests. Analyzing inter-state conflict, Yagil Levy (2016) conceptualizes *civilian control of militarization* as leverage over "the mechanisms for legitimizing the use of force", or the means of constructing democracies' coercive deployment of soldiers as appropriate and effective (see March and Olsen 2004). Specifically, controlling militarization "involves the

political discourse in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role” to submit politicians’ decision to deploy soldiers “to a deliberative process that takes place within the public and political arenas and addresses the legitimacy to use force” (Levy 2016, 79). Controlling militarization thus entails seeking not to constrain the armed forces’ power through the formal authorities of politicians and bureaucrats, but, rather, to delegitimize democracies’ deployment of the armed forces through both civil society actors’ and allied politicians’ discourse. Without efforts to discursively delegitimize democracies’ military deployment, militarization is “socially accepted as a normal, pervasive, and enduring strategic preference” (85). If civilian efforts to control militarization as a practice do not accompany civilian efforts to control the military as an institution, then democracy risks becoming “an irrational value system that espouses war as a goal in itself” (81), given how the state becoming organized around “rational-legal bureaucratic norms” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 14) is necessary for democratic consolidation. If we consider Levy’s (2016) framework for gaining civilian leverage over international use of force applicable to domestic use of force, and if we consider controlling militarization necessary for limiting the risks of soldiers’ crimefighting deployments in Latin America, we therefore should prioritize civilian efforts based on legitimacy mechanisms for understanding how civilians can gain leverage over this phenomenon.

Levy (2016) posits several expectations to help pinpoint and explain the impact of civilian attempts at controlling militarization. Generally, civilians can control militarization by “subjecting the elected civilians’ use of force to a deliberative process that addresses the legitimacy of using force” (85). *Deliberation* entails “[r]elative slowness in decision making ... through argumentation in which everyone’s opinion is in principle equally valuable and equally fallible”, while *addressing the legitimacy of using force* involves deliberation that is not “confined to the operational aspects of military policies” but instead “extend[s] to the broader logic behind and rightness of such policies” (80). Delegitimization thus involves critically examining both the strategic “logic of consequences” and normative “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 2004) underpinning military deployment. *Discourse*, or spoken or written communication that “questions and shapes the social power relations affecting the legitimacy of using force” (Levy 2016, 81), is the main fora in which this delegitimization manifests. Deliberation, delegitimization, evidence-based argumentation over baseless reasoning (*information*), and critical debate over only problem-solving discussions (*criticism*) are not only political and organizational objectives but, also, necessary discursive means of controlling militarization (Levy 2016, 80). Debates specifically about the nature of security threats, troop levels, troop deployment costs, use of force, and domestic political interests behind deployments reflect “how the control of militarization operates” (82). Hence, “the broader the scope of the debates ..., the [extent of] slow thoughtfulness with which the debates are conducted, the degree of openness in discussing ... issues”, and the extent of “barriers to influencing decision makers, the availability of information, and the range of speakers, the greater the control of militarization” (82) can be. If we consider such means necessary for reducing the risks of militarization in Latin America, we therefore should prioritize civilian efforts based on discursive delegitimization for understanding how civilians can control this phenomenon.

Accordingly, I argue that civilian actors can help reduce the risks of militarization or the armed forces’ police-ization in Latin America by discursively constructing and rendering, through public debate, soldiers’ crimefighting deployment as inappropriate for democracy and ineffective

for security. The more that civilian actors employ discursive delegitimization, the more that the public debate comes to reflect the view of militarization as illegitimate (Levy 2016). The more that the public debate reflects this view, the more that politicians' electoral incentives and armed forces' institutional incentives come to favor *demilitarization*, or the armed forces' withdrawal from crimefighting deployments in sites of police-ization. Because they are rational actors whose security policy decisions are driven by strategic cost-benefit analyses in the pursuit of power (e.g. Hunter 2001; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007; Bruneau 2013), Latin American politicians' electoral incentives favor militarization due to citizens' demand for drastic measures to address spiraling insecurity fueled by organized crime (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2019) and Latin American armed forces' institutional incentives favor militarization because this phenomenon constitutes internal security, one of the five decision-making areas wherein the military can accrue and exercise institutional autonomy and political influence (Croissant et al. 2011; Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017). If the degree to which the public debate presents militarization as inappropriate and ineffective increases, then citizens' demand for militarization threatens to decrease such that politicians' electoral incentives to sustain militarization are likely to diminish. Moreover, the armed forces' ability to leverage militarization into institutional autonomy and political influence is likely to diminish because the threat of politicians and other civilian actors attempting to constrain the armed forces through power-related mechanisms aimed at curbing such autonomy and political influence increases (see Croissant et al. 2011).

I also argue that, among civilians, civil society actors are especially capable of discursive delegitimization than politicians. Civilians here fit into four categories: politicians who support militarization due to their pro-armed forces, pro-punishment ideology; politicians who support militarization as long as it is electorally advantageous; politicians who challenge militarization due mainly to their strongly pro-democracy, pro-peace ideologies; and civil society actors who challenge militarization due to a combination of their pro-democracy, pro-peace ideologies and organizational incentives around non-governmental funding. *Civil society actors*, or “self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals” that are “relatively autonomous from the state” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 7), are unlikely to favor militarization as voters' and their representatives' preferences for having soldiers on the streets amidst insecurity limit the need for non-governmental organizations to emerge and advocate for such deployment.

On the one hand, while many politicians' ideological preference and electoral incentives favor militarization (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2019), even those whose ideology aligns more with that of civil society actors in supporting democracy and peace over military power and violence struggle to achieve discursive delegitimization. This is because such politicians are highly vulnerable to co-optation by the armed forces in the process of gathering information for discursive purposes. The principal-agent problem characterizes crimefighting deployments as politicians depend heavily on the armed forces to provide information about to what extent soldiers are complying with politicians' directives. If the armed forces agree to share information about crimefighting deployments with politicians who ideologically oppose militarization, this and future exchanges can be conditional on such politicians moderating their discursive delegitimization (e.g., Hunter 2001; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007; Bruneau 2013).

On the other hand, civil society actors are minimally vulnerable to co-optation from the armed forces because there is no direct principal-agent relationship between the parties. Civil society

actors consequently depend less on the armed forces for information about crimefighting deployments than politicians do, given how the armed forces are unlikely to share information with civil society, and are less likely than politicians to moderate their delegitimizing discourse in exchange for information. Civil society actors may be more vulnerable to military coercion than politicians are, given how civil society actors are not principals, and therefore may be less likely to use discursive delegitimization in the first place for fear of repression. However, these actors' organizational incentives revolve around securing more funds from major donors like allied elites, foreign governments, and international non-governmental organizations. Discursive delegitimization is not only normatively right within the "logic of consequences" (March and Olsen 2004) but, also, strategically beneficial for civil society actors as they exhibit the type of pro-democracy, pro-peace communication for which donors fund them (e.g., Linz and Stepan 1996; Hunter 2001; Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007; Bruneau 2013; Dizard 2018).

For the balance of incentives to tip towards demilitarization, however, politicians must compensate the armed forces for their loss of power within the internal security decision-making area by expanding their power within other decision-making areas like elections, public policy, external defense, and military organization. Although the delegitimization of crimefighting deployments threatens to undermine the armed forces' general power, the armed forces' institutional incentives are less sensitive to the public debate than politicians' electoral incentives are. This is because citizens and voters hold politicians accountable more directly than they hold the armed forces accountable. If demilitarization is to occur due to delegitimization, the decision for demilitarize therefore is likely to come from politicians because militarization constitutes the armed forces' power within the internal security decision-making area and delegitimization affects the armed forces mainly by diminishing politicians' electoral incentives to keep soldiers on the streets. The military also can use its decreasingly popular crimefighting deployment as a bargaining platform by conditioning the extent to which they conduct the deployment according to politicians' directives on the extent to which they obtain concessions from these politicians (see Pion-Berlin 2016). In short, civilians, especially civil society actors, can control the risks of militarization by employing discursive delegitimization and, thus, by enabling demilitarization provided that politicians compensate the armed forces by expanding military power in other decision-making areas. The dilemma is that, to control militarization, civilians must be prepared to lose control elsewhere, reflecting military power's stickiness and democracy's fragility.

Observable implications: Media coverage, demilitarization, and compensation

My argument yields several "observable implications" (King et al. 1994, 19), or phenomena that we should be able to see in the real world if a claim is valid. First and (for this paper) most importantly, employing discursive delegitimization should be necessary and sufficient for civilian efforts, especially civil society actors, aimed at monitoring militarization to garner robust media coverage, given how media coverage constitutes public debate regarding military deployment as I will discuss below (e.g., Baum and Potter 2008). Second, delegitimization should precede demilitarization. Third, the armed forces should accrue or should appear positioned to accrue power within decision-making areas other than internal security around the time of demilitarization. The more evidence that I can bring to bear in support of these three observable implications, the more confident that I can be in the validity of my argument about delegitimization enabling demilitarization conditional on compensation. The first observable implication regarding media coverage, which warrants the most detail as it requires examining

my argument versus alternative explanations to a greater degree, rests partially on the assumption that such civilian actors and news organizations are rational as they coordinate around information based on strategic cost-benefit analyses (Hunter 2001). Latin American armed forces' police-ization "places a spotlight on military behavior" (Dizard 2018, v) that incentivizes civilian actors not only to attempt to control risks but, also, to pursue more media coverage of their efforts. Media coverage, or the aggregate level of reporting on current events by news organizations (e.g., Schudson 2002), can reflect and reinforce the impact of civilian efforts to control both the military and militarization.

News organizations specifically can aid civilian efforts through the power-based mechanism of monitoring and civilian control of militarization through the legitimacy-based mechanism of discourse. In terms of controlling the military, *monitoring* "is a coercive strategy that raises the expected costs of military non-compliance by increasing the probability of punishment" through "oversight institutions, surveillance mechanisms, and reporting systems inside or outside the armed forces" (Croissant et al. 2011, 86). Such institutions can include democracies' executive, judicial, and legislative branches, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like civil society groups, think tanks, and news organizations (e.g., Born 2006; Bruneau and Matei 2008). News organizations may not be "change agents" (Croissant et al. 2011, 83) that directly assert civilian control via power-related mechanisms because, generally, journalists cannot coerce soldiers. News organizations' monitoring nonetheless can provide information that echoes and enables other civilians' attempts to delegitimize militarization. In turn, these other institutions can enable and reinforce the media's monitoring by providing newsworthy information about the military that either is private (i.e., restricted to the military until discovered by civilians) or concerns the institutions' own attempts at civilian control. In terms of controlling militarization, news organizations can aid civilian efforts by shaping the public debate around delegitimization of armed forces' crimefighting deployments. The more that news organizations cover such efforts and the more that such efforts involve discursive delegitimization, the more likely that the public is to consider militarization an inappropriate and ineffective security policy. The more that the public considers crimefighting deployments illegitimate, the more that politicians' electoral incentives and, to a less direct extent, the armed forces' institutional incentives shift toward demilitarization (see Baum and Potter 2008).

As Levy (2010) has shown, though, being able to help delegitimize militarization via media coverage does not mean that news organizations necessarily will use this ability. To understand when news organizations produce robust coverage of civilian efforts, let us assume that news organizations consider it less costly and more beneficial to cover civilian institutions with greater access to information about the military, greater formal authority over the military, and more potential to alter the status quo vis-à-vis the military. First, news organizations prefer covering actors with greater information access because doing so reduces journalists' costs of developing their own sources to a greater degree and enables more credible reporting. News organizations may prefer using such actors as sources instead of subjects, yet actors with more information access may have more leverage vis-à-vis news organizations and, thus, can compel news organizations more forcefully to cover their efforts in exchange for information. Second, news organizations prefer covering actors with greater formal authorities over the military because this enhances organizations' benefits of providing newsworthy content as such actors, like politicians, generally are more politically consequential. News organizations may prefer using

these actors as sources instead of subjects, yet actors with more authority over the military presumably have more influence over other areas of security policy and, generally, national politics. Such actors may have more leverage over news organizations to compel coverage of their efforts in exchange for information on other topics. Third, news organizations prefer covering actors who are more capable of altering the status quo vis-à-vis military power as such actors are more newsworthy. Media coverage thus depends on background conditions that enable civilian actors to have more information access and authority and on characteristics that enable them to be more impactful (e.g., Galtung and Holmboe Ruge 1965; Baum and Potter 2008).

These rationalist assumptions yield multiple mutually inclusive hypotheses regarding media coverage of civilian attempts to control militarization. First, media coverage is robust regarding civilian actors that are powerful in terms of possessing the formal authority to intrude into, and to coerce the armed forces (Croissant et al. 2011). Powerful civilian actors have more access to information about, and, thus, greater ability to sanction, counterbalance, and monitor the military. By providing journalists with novel information on the military to bolster civilian control efforts and by leveraging sanctions, counterbalancing, and monitoring against the military in a newsworthy way, powerful civilian actors thus are more credible information sources and more attractive media subjects. Such actors also can use their power in compelling the media to cover their attempts at civilian control, including by directly advocating for more coverage in exchange for information access regarding security policy or other topics. Advocacy aside, that powerful civilian actors can offer the media more information and exclusive coverage about non-military topics can incentivize the media to cover these actors' civilian control efforts. This first hypothesis privileges national politicians, on the one hand, over civil society actors and subnational politicians, on the other, as the former have more authorities vis-à-vis the military.

Media coverage hypothesis 1 (power): Civilian actors with formal authority over the armed forces garner robust media coverage of their efforts to control militarization.

Second, media coverage is robust regarding civilian actors that are credible (e.g., Groeling and Baum 2008) in terms of geographic proximity to military operations. The principal-agent problem of civilian control (Feaver 2005) is such that, because soldiers have highly specific expertise and private information when deploying violence in spaces distant from the politicians who delegate their tasks and the bureaucrats who are supposed to monitor them, civilians struggle to develop the credibility around military affairs that is necessary to constrain the armed forces' decision-making authority and delegitimize their deployment. Civilian actors who are physically closer to military operations may have more access to information about, and, thus, greater ability to help sanction, counterbalance, and monitor the military. Closer civilian actors also represent more newsworthy subjects because they offer a more local perspective on military operations. News organizations consider civilian actors who are closer to the action more credible information sources and more attractive subjects, thus enhancing these actors' leverage and enabling them to advocate for more media coverage in order to advance their goals.

Media coverage hypothesis 2 (proximity): Civilian actors with proximity to military operations garner robust media coverage of their efforts to control militarization.

Thirdly, media coverage is robust regarding civilian actors whose objective is to control militarization. Civilian actors' goal of controlling militarization, as evidenced by their titles and the way that they present their motivations, represents a costly signal to news organizations that these civilian actors have or are positioned to obtain access to information, authority over the armed forces in the case of politicians and bureaucrats, and the ability of alter the status quo vis-à-vis military power if the goal translates into action. The goal is a costly signal because, if civilian actors have the goal of controlling militarization but are unable to fulfill this goal, the actors lose credibility. It also can be an effective signal in that, ever seeking shortcuts to reduce their reporting costs, journalists assume that civilian actors with such objectives indeed have the capacity to achieve the goal (e.g., Galtung and Holmboe Ruge 1965; Baum and Potter 2008).

Medi coverage hypothesis 3 (objectives): Civilian actors with objectives of delegitimizing militarization garner robust media coverage of their efforts to control militarization.

Finally, media coverage is robust regarding civilian actors that employ broad discourse in attempt to control militarization as per my argument. Beyond objectives, actors that employ deliberation, delegitimization, information, and criticism around perceived security threats, troops levels and deployment costs, use of force, and political interests underpinning police-ization are more likely to be impactful in controlling militarization. Such efforts most embody discursive delegitimization (Levy 2016). News organizations have incentives to cover such efforts because, as per my argument, these civilian actors have more potential to alter the status quo vis-à-vis military power, of which police-ization is constitutive. While *Hypothesis 1 (power)* excludes civil society actors because they have less formal authority over the armed forces than politicians, this final hypothesis privileges civil society actors insofar as they are more capable of using discursive delegitimization to turn the public debate against militarization.

Media coverage hypothesis 4 (discourse): Civilian actors with broad discourse garner more media coverage of their efforts to control militarization.

Empirical context: The Brazilian Army's 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro

To examine these hypotheses and, more broadly, my argument's three observable implications, I will demonstrate the argument's "internal validity" (Gerring 2012, 84), or the extent to which the argument helps explain a given empirical context. This context is Brazil, where civilian actors have been struggling to consolidate Latin America's largest democracy and subordinate Latin America's largest military after 21 years of authoritarian rule by the armed forces (1964-1985) (e.g., Bruneau and Tollefson 2014; Garcia 2014; Bruneau 2018; Hunter and Power 2019). More specifically, the need for controlling militarization's risks was especially acute over 2018 in the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan region, Latin America's third largest with 13 million people. President Michel Temer's *Federal Intervention in Public Security in Rio de Janeiro State* (Feb.-Dec. 2018) granted the Brazilian Army unprecedented authority to command, control, and reform municipal and state law enforcement agencies in the face of deepening crime and violence (Gabinete de Intervenção Federal 2018). Concurrently, Temer's *Operation Rio de Janeiro* (Jul. 2017-Dec. 2018) was deploying the Army, Navy, and Air Force against Rio de Janeiro's formidable drug-trafficking and arms-smuggling gangs (Ministério da Defesa 2020). The Federal Intervention and Operation Rio de Janeiro were discrete missions, the latter more closely symbolizing Brazilian presidents' increasingly frequent deployment of soldiers for

crimefighting (Ministério da Defesa 2020). Nonetheless, many observers associated both the Army's expanded institutional authorities and intensified anti-crime operations over 2018 with the Federal Intervention and, thus, considered the Federal Intervention acutely constitutive of Rio de Janeiro's militarization (e.g., Leite et al. 2019).¹ In these regards, the Brazilian Army's 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro represents an "extreme", potentially "influential", and "crucial" (Gerring 2008) context of militarization because the armed forces' police-ization was especially acute, because how controlling militarization develops here could affect how it develops elsewhere in Latin America (given the size of "Rio", of Brazil's military, and of Brazil's democracy) and because the acuteness of militarization and legacy of military authoritarianism make Rio's demilitarization via discursive delegitimization seemingly improbable. Understanding how civilians can control militarization here therefore is especially fruitful for understanding how civilians can do so elsewhere in Latin America.

Observable implication 1 (Delegitimization):

Media coverage of civilian institutions monitoring the Federal Intervention

Methodology for hypothesis testing

In 2018, seven temporary *civilian institutions*, or organizations led and comprised by non-military actors, emerged specifically to monitor the Brazilian Army's Federal Intervention in Rio. These included one executive branch agency, two legislative committees, and one legislative branch agency in Brasilia (the national capital), and one state judicial branch agency, one city council committee, and one non-governmental organization (NGO) in Rio. Their unprecedented emergence and varied experiences are remarkable. Operation Rio de Janeiro was one of an increasing number of Guarantee Law and Order (GLO) operations wherein Brazilian presidents deploy the military for spatially and temporally demarcated internal security missions to supplement police agencies. Around half of the 23 GLO operations aimed specifically at containing urban violence from 1992 to 2017 had occurred in Rio, five times more than in any other Brazilian state (Ministério da Defesa 2020). Although responsible for monitoring the military, Foreign Relations and National Defense Commissions in neither the Federal Senate nor the Chamber of Deputies previously had established committees or held hearings specifically regarding GLO operations (Câmara de Deputados 2020; Senado Federal 2020). This absence of legislative monitoring seemingly reflected civilians' historical shortcomings in controlling the military and, specifically, militarization vis-à-vis Brazil's GLO operations (e.g., Harig 2019; Passos 2019) and Latin American civilians' general disinterest in military oversight (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007; Bruneau 2013). These institutions also varied in power, proximity, objectives, and discourse as described below. Such remarkable emergence and variation make these institutions aimed at monitoring the Brazilian Army's 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio fruitful cases for understanding media coverage of efforts to control militarization.

To illustrate that media coverage was robust around civilian efforts that employed discursive delegitimization in monitoring the Federal Intervention and limited around other efforts, I first assess institutions' power, proximity, objectives, discourse, and media coverage. Regarding *H1 (power)*, I classify civilian institutions as *strong* if they are nested within broader institutions that have formal authorities over the Brazilian Army, such as the Ministry of Defense, National Congress, National Defense Council, and Public Ministry (Bruneau and Tollefson 2014; Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017). Otherwise, I classify them as *weak*. Regarding *H2 (proximity)*, I

¹ This claim also stems from original interview data, which I discuss and present later in the paper.

classify civilian institutions based in Rio as *close* to the Federal Intervention and otherwise, as *distant*. Regarding *H3 (objectives)* and *H4 (discourse)*, I identify Portuguese-language texts online, namely founding documents describing institutions' establishments and final reports presenting institutions' evaluations of the Federal Intervention. I classify institutions whose founding documents reflect a motivation to delegitimize militarization as having *deep* objectives. Otherwise, I classify them as having *shallow* objectives. I classify institutions whose final reports employ deliberation, delegitimization, information, and criticism around perceived security threats, troops levels and deployment costs, use of force, and political interests as having *broad* discourse. Otherwise, I classify them as having narrow *discourse*. Regarding media coverage, I examine the breadth and depth with which news organizations portray these institutions beyond reporting about institutions' establishment. I use Nexis Uni to identify Portuguese-language news articles about institutions by searching for institutions' full and (estimated) shortened names. To my knowledge, although it excludes some Brazilian newspapers of record like *Folha de S. Paulo* while including some less prominent sources, Nexis Unis is the most comprehensive search engine for swiftly and systematically collecting contemporary Brazilian media coverage. It captures articles from government news agencies, but such coverage should not bias my operationalization of media coverage considerably because these agencies' coverage is largely descriptive and consistent with other news organizations' content.

After identifying articles, I categorize them as follows. *Attributions* describe the Brazilian Army's Federal Intervention Cabinet and/or the Temer administration as clarifying and/or justifying aspects of the Federal Intervention in a way that seemingly responds to institutions' actions or discourse, whether textual or not. *Profiles* describe institutions in detail without seemingly attributing the Federal Intervention Cabinet's and/or Temer administration's behavior to said institution. *Mentions* reference institutions without either profiling them or attributing to them government behavior around the Federal Intervention. I then sum the number of articles about each institution within each category based on the weighted level of civilian control that each article type seemingly credits institutions with fostering. I ascribe three points to *attributions*, two to *profiles*, and one to *mentions*. If an institution's articles total minimum nine points, I classify it as receiving *robust* media coverage; otherwise, *limited* coverage. I select nine as the *robust* threshold for "triangulation" (Adcock and Collier 2001, 540) purposes. Three *attributions* of three points each or another coverage combination totaling minimum nine points seemingly confirms that an institution has the potential to help compel the government to defend and/or to justify the Federal Intervention in a way that fosters civilian control over militarization and, generally, the military through both discursive delegitimization (Levy 2016) and active monitoring (Croissant et al. 2011). Compelling the government to defend and justify militarization contributes to civilian control because, as a form of monitoring, it intrudes into military deployment planning and coerces the government by raising the risk of sanction if what the government defends and justifies publicly is misaligned with the policy decisions and preferences of other civilian actors like opposition politicians and civil society organizations.

Second, I analyze whether the hypothesized institutional conditions and characteristics are necessary and/or sufficient for robust media coverage. Necessity/sufficiency logic (Gerring 2012, 335-342) helps gauge whether institutions must be *strong* in terms of power, *near* in terms of proximity, *deep* in terms of objectives, and/or *broad* in terms of discourse to garner *robust* media coverage. If the factor underscored by a given hypothesis is present (alternatively, absent)

whenever civilian institutions receive *robust* (alternatively, *limited*) media coverage, to include always (alternatively, never) being present in combination with other hypothesized factors, then said factor is *necessary* for explaining media coverage of civilian efforts to control militarization. If the factor is present whenever institutions receive *robust* media coverage, to include being the only hypothesized factor present in at least one instance, then said factor is *sufficient* for explaining media coverage. Sufficient factors have extensive explanatory power over the outcome of interest while necessary factors have moderate explanatory power.

Through this analysis, I illustrate that *broad* discourse (*H4*) is necessary and sufficient for civilian institutions to garner *robust* media coverage regarding efforts to control militarization. Although *weak* in power to control the military (*H1*), although comparable to other institutions in terms of being *near* to the Federal Intervention (*H2*), and although *deep* in deliberative and delegitimizing objectives (*H3*), the Intervention Observatory, a Rio-based NGO, is the only one of seven institutions to employ *broad* discourse (*H4*) and, ultimately, to garner *robust* media coverage around efforts to control the Brazilian Army’s 2018 operations. This finding supports my argument’s first observable implication that civilian institutions that employ discursive delegitimization in monitoring the armed forces can shape the public debate around militarization more forcefully. Table 1 below previews these findings.

Table 1: Civilian attempts to control the 2018 Federal Intervention in Rio de Janeiro

<i>Temporary monitoring institution</i>	<i>Power</i>	<i>Proximity</i>	<i>Objectives</i>	<i>Discourse</i>	<i>Media coverage**</i>		<i>Supports hypotheses***</i>			
					<i>Points</i>	<i>Extent</i>	<i>H1</i>	<i>H2</i>	<i>H3</i>	<i>H4</i>
Intervention Observatory	Weak	Near	Deep	Broad*	19	Robust	N	Y	Y	Y
Chamber Commission	Strong	Distant	Deep	Narrow	5	Limited	N	Y	N	Y
Favelas for Rights Network	Weak	Near	Deep	Narrow	0	Limited	Y	N	N	Y
Legislative Observatory	Strong	Distant	Shallow	Narrow	0	Limited	N	N	Y	Y
ObservaRIO	Weak	Distant	Shallow	Narrow	0	Limited	Y	Y	Y	Y
Representation Commission	Weak	Near	Shallow	Narrow	0	Limited	Y	N	Y	Y
Senate Commission	Strong	Distant	Shallow	Narrow	0	Limited	N	Y	Y	Y

* *Necessary and sufficient condition for efforts to receive robust media coverage and, thus, to be potentially impactful vis-à-vis controlling militarization.*

** *Threshold for robust media coverage is nine points based on some combination of media attributions (three), profiles (two), and mentions (one).*

*** *“Y” = “Yes”, “N” = “No”. An institution supports a given hypothesis if the factor predicted by the hypothesis is present (alternatively, absent) and media coverage is robust (alternatively, limited).*

Given spacing constraints, below I focus on the Intervention Observatory and present my analyses of the six other institutions in the online appendix. Among other institutions, it is most notable how the Favelas for Rights Network differs from the Intervention Observatory only in that the Network has *weak* discourse and *limited* media coverage. This supports my argument’s first observable implication that *broad* discourse is both necessary and sufficient for institutions to garner *robust* media coverage of efforts to control militarization. Secondly, it is notable how having *deep* objectives is necessary, although insufficient, to receive any substantive coverage whatsoever, given that only this institutional characteristic corresponds with some

combination of media attributions, profiles, and mentions in the Intervention Observatory and Chamber Commission and that there is no substantive media coverage regarding five of the seven institutions. These considerations support my decision to focus on the Intervention Observatory below and, in the online appendix, to dedicate most attention to the Chamber Commission. They also raise the possibility of measurement error as I will discuss in concluding.

Case study: Intervention Observatory

The Intervention Observatory, a temporary, Rio-based civil society or non-governmental organization within the private Candido Mendes University, was *weak vis-à-vis power (H1)*, *near vis-à-vis proximity (H2)*, *deep vis-à-vis objectives (H3)*, *broad vis-à-vis discourse (H4)*, and *robust vis-à-vis media coverage* and, by extension, potential impact in controlling the Federal Intervention. These findings support *H2 (proximity)*, *H3 (objectives)*, and *H4 (discourse)*. Regarding *objectives (H3)*, the Intervention Observatory was *deep*, textually presenting its establishment as motivated by both deliberation and delegitimization. It aimed “to monitor and publicize the deployments, impacts, and human rights violations stemming from the Federal Intervention ... via documentation and rigorous analysis of facts and data” (Observatório da Intervenção 2020b)². Despite the Federal Intervention’s constitutionality, the Observatory’s establishment was motivated by the following: the policy’s vague aims and scope; Temer’s decision to place the Federal Intervention Cabinet under military instead of civilian leadership; the possibility that the government would delegate soldiers’ human rights violations to military instead of civilian courts; and the perspective that military utilization for policing was counterproductive, inefficient, and unsustainable (Observatório da Intervenção 2020a). The Observatory’s establishment thus stemmed from both careful, slow analysis and consideration of appropriateness (e.g., military leadership and human rights violations) and effectiveness (e.g., vagueness and inadequacy) around the Federal Intervention.

Regarding *discourse (H4)*, the Intervention Observatory was *broad* in attempting to control militarization. It used deliberation and information as “the Observatory team researched, met, and analyzed data from diverse sources to evaluate” (Observatório da Intervenção 2019: 3) empirically the Federal Intervention’s costs and security impact. It used criticism and (de)legitimation vis-à-vis both appropriateness and consequences in presenting militarization as an illogical and ineffective “model that should not be repeated in other crisis situations” (3). It stated that, although President Temer’s decision to place

generals in command of public security was received hopefully by much of the population ..., the reiterated use of ... [soldiers] in security crises risked eroding the military’s image. Moreover, the interventionist model, costly and unsustainable, proved ineffective in the face of police agencies that need structural reforms, anti-corruption measures, and greater intelligence capability (Observatório da Intervenção 2019: 33).

The Intervention Observatory thus attempted to delegitimize militarization by criticizing the Federal Intervention’s appropriateness (inadequate conditions vis-à-vis policing, inadequate implementation vis-à-vis image erosion) and effectiveness (fiscal unsustainability). It also questioned the Federal Intervention’s threat assessment, troop levels (albeit indirectly), and force utilization (as a model) by criticizing how “significant investments were not made in fighting

² All document excerpts translated and paraphrased from Portuguese.

*milicias*³ and police corruption” and how the Federal Intervention failed partially because of its “approach to the problems of violence and criminality through a war logic ... of combat troops, *favela*⁴ occupations, and large-scale operations” (3). The Observatory questioned costs by concluding “that the military’s interference and the injection of BRL 1.2 billion⁵ of federal resources did not produce significant changes in public security” (3). It questioned interests by characterizing the Federal Intervention as the “political move of a government at the end of its mandate and without legitimacy (Temer) upon another government in its last gasps and without legitimacy (Pezão)” (32).⁶ The Observatory also critiqued how, although the policy enabled a federal loan that was “essential for overcoming the financial crisis” (32) engulfing Rio state since 2016 (see Coelho 2018), state employees had not been paid over one year later. Whether lack of payment stems from corruption or inefficiency, the Observatory thus challenged the Federal Intervention’s efficacy vis-à-vis political interests in fiscal terms by presenting the measure as an ineffective, costly means of obtaining more federal funding for state government.

Regarding media coverage, the Intervention Observatory was *robust* and, thus, potentially impactful in controlling militarization. Media coverage included two *attributions*, four *profiles*, and seven *mentions*, totaling 19 points. March 2018 saw two *mentions* of the Observatory’s first public hearing to collect *favela* residents’ testimonies as exemplifying civil society mobilization around the Federal Intervention (Agence France-Presse 2018; Pennafort 2018a). April 2018 saw one *attribution* (Jansen 2018a) and one *profile* (CE Noticias Financieras 2018a) address the Observatory’s first, highly critical report (Observatório da Intervenção 2018a). The *attribution*, entitled “Federal Intervention Cabinet refutes report about military action in Rio”, quoted the Army’s response to the Observatory’s revelation that the number of Rio shootings had increased since the Federal Intervention’s initiation relative to the same 2017 period. The Army responded that it was “dedicated to the established objectives of progressively reducing criminality indices and strengthening Rio ... public security institutions” through “emergency and structural measures” (Jansen 2018a). Although the Army’s response itself may not necessarily have been delegitimizing, that the Army defended and justified the Federal Intervention in response to the Observatory suggests that these efforts were impactful in controlling militarization because they used monitoring to intrude and to coerce the Army into transparency regarding security plans.

In July and August 2018, two *profiles* (Agência Brasil 2018a; 2018d) and one *mention* (CE Noticias Financieras 2018a) referenced another critical Observatory report about how, as soldiers suddenly transitioned from backing up cops to directly combatting criminal organizations, shootouts were increasing and security forces’ intelligence collection and exploitation were decreasing (Observatório da Intervenção 2018b). In September 2018, alongside a *mention* (Pennafort 2018b), an *attribution* described Observatory representative Pablo Nunes’ testimony before the United Nations Human Rights Council. The attribution depicted Nunes demanding “that the Brazilian government avoid the use of soldiers for public security operations, implement more efficient security policy based on intelligence and prevention, and revise the

³ Right-wing paramilitary organizations that compete with drug gangs for control over criminal markets (Arias and Barnes, 2016). The Federal Intervention targeted drug gangs but not *milicias*.

⁴ Low-income and typically high-crime communities with limited government presence.

⁵ Approximately USD 333 million over 2018.

⁶ Both President Temer (2016-2018) and Rio de Janeiro State Governor Luiz Fernando Pezão (2014-2019) had been facing mounting corruption allegations and had been unable to implement their neoliberal policy agendas; Temer was seeking re-election in October 2018 (Correio Braziliense, 2018; Mendonça, 2018; Struck, 2018; Terenzi, 2018)

drug war model”. It depicted Maria Nazareth Farani Azevedo, Brazil’s Ambassador to the United Nations, responding that the Federal Intervention was effective and “widely popular” (Chade 2018). Again, compelling the government to defend and justify the Federal Intervention was a step toward delegitimizing and, thus, controlling militarization via monitoring. Several *mentions* of Observatory criticism from October 2018 to January 2019 concluded the coverage (Agência Brasil 2019; CE Noticias Financieras 2018b; O Globo 2018b).

Observable implication 2 (Demilitarization):

Delegitimization of the Federal Intervention and demilitarization of Rio de Janeiro

My argument’s second observable implication is that delegitimization should precede demilitarization. While my analysis of media coverage suggests that employing discursive delegitimization indeed enables civilian actors to shape the public debate, the Federal Intervention’s legitimacy was subject to considerable contestation throughout 2018. On the one hand, several factors beyond the Brazilian Army’s intensifying regional deployments and beyond the narrative construction of local drug trafficking gangs as a national security threat (Dario 2020) gave the impression that Rio’s 2018 militarization was appropriate in terms of democratic norms and effective in terms of security provision. The National Congress had supported the Federal Intervention overwhelmingly in February 2018 and the Federal Intervention remained under the ultimate command of President Temer (Rossi 2018). Citizens supported the Federal Intervention and, specifically, the Army’s crimefighting role (Datafolha 2018; Fontes 2018; G1 2018b; Datafolha and Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública 2019). The Army presented the Federal Intervention as an effective violence reduction model (Câmara de Deputados 2018b; Galdo 2018; Superior Tribunal Militar 2019) to replicate elsewhere in Brazil (Charleaux 2018; DiLorenzo 2018; Woody 2018). Strongly anti-crime, pro-military Jair Bolsonaro, a right-wing populist who assumed the presidency in January 2019, supported the Federal Intervention as a Rio congressman (Adorno 2018) and suggested sustaining the concurrent Operation Rio de Janeiro as president-elect (G1 2018a). On the other hand, my preliminary research suggests that delegitimization was a prominent aspect of the Federal Intervention. I conducted 18 semi-structured, Portuguese-language interviews with Brazilian military officials and security policy researchers via snowball sampling in Rio over August 2018. My interviews concerned the Federal Intervention’s consequences for civil-military relations.⁷ I did not ask explicitly about “legitimacy”, yet several interviewees volunteered that the Army’s crimefighting role had come to appear decreasingly appropriate and effective through the Federal Intervention. One said,

the effect on the military was negative because the Federal Intervention left the security problem unresolved. Everything returned to how it had been before, but with more violence. The military’s image became that they were no more effective than the police. The military disliked the mission, too. It feared that soldiers would be corrupted and that pointing guns at, and repressing citizens would bring scrutiny [from Portuguese].

The interviewee thus implied that public monitoring of the Army’s Federal Intervention (“scrutiny”) had reflected and reinforced militarization’s delegitimization in terms of appropriateness (corruption, repression) and effectiveness (insecurity, violence). Moreover, three interviewees implied that the Federal Intervention had been delegitimizing because the

⁷ University of Wisconsin-Madison ED/SBS IRB 2019-0782. Sensitivities around military research preclude identifying interviewees’ institutions and roles.

population where military operations occurred neither understood nor supported the mission, two seemingly necessary conditions for democracies' military usage to be legitimate. One added that, through popular music and parties in *favelas* (i.e., low-income neighborhoods historically neglected by government), criminal organizations had sustained legitimacy among locals. In contrast, four interviewees suggested that the Federal Intervention had enhanced the military's legitimacy because, by curbing violence and demonstrating discipline and "values", soldiers had accrued prestige and perceived efficacy relative to cops and politicians. This contestation over the Federal Intervention's appropriateness and effectiveness further illustrates how the politics of legitimization is vital for understanding how civilians can control militarization via monitoring (Levy 2016) despite this being a primarily power-oriented mechanism (Croissant et al. 2011) and how Rio's 2018 militarization can be generative context for building such knowledge.

The ultimate indicator of controlling militarization with respect to reducing the risks of soldiers' crimefighting deployment is *demilitarization* (i.e., soldiers' indefinite withdrawal from crimefighting deployments), which surprisingly occurred in 2018 Rio. Despite the aforementioned factors that seemingly portended persistent militarization, both the Federal Intervention and Operation Rio de Janeiro ended in December 2018 (Barbon 2018; Ministério da Defesa 2020). Moreover, although the "punitive populism" (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2019) that incentivizes Latin American politicians to deploy soldiers for crimefighting as a means of cultivating voters' support had enabled his election (Hunter and Power 2019), Bolsonaro has given the military no new crimefighting missions or authorities in Rio de Janeiro (Ministério da Defesa 2020). Bolsonaro's defense minister, an Army general, even has contradicted his colleagues by asserting that the Federal Intervention should not be replicated (Alegretti 2019). Although this about-face could stem from Bolsonaro's and generals' reluctance to deploy soldiers while extrajudicial killings are prosecutable under civilian law (G1 2018; Kawaguti 2019), that Bolsonaro's predecessor Temer made extrajudicial killings prosecutable under military jurisdiction in the early days of Operation Rio de Janeiro in 2017 (UOL 2017) belies such logic. Rio's demilitarization thus is a puzzle that delegitimization may help illuminate. Indeed, according to one report, the fact that the armed forces "can be subjected to strain on their public image if they are involved in shootouts that result in deaths of innocent people or of their own members" and if soldiers are "corrupted by criminal agents – problems already confronted by the police" (Kawaguti 2019) is a main reason for generals to lobby Bolsonaro against sustaining law enforcement missions. If monitoring and delegitimization by civilian institutions and the media strain military organizations' public image while corruption and fatalities reveal military utilization's inappropriateness and ineffectiveness for democratic law enforcement, then perhaps the dynamics analyzed here enabled civilian control over militarization via delegitimization by encouraging politicians and generals to take soldiers off Rio's streets. In short, this evidence seemingly supports my argument's second observable implication that delegitimization precedes demilitarization.

Observable implication 3 (Compensation):

Expansion of Brazilian Army power beyond the Federal Intervention

My argument's third observable implication is that the armed forces should accrue or should appear positioned to accrue power within decision-making areas other than internal security around the time of demilitarization. Throughout 2018, as it lost power within the internal security decision-making area via delegitimization and demilitarization, the Army indeed was positioned

to accrue more power within the elections and public policy decision-making areas. Such accrual of military power suggests that compensation occurred as increased autonomy and influence within other decision-making areas became a necessary condition for the armed forces to withdraw from internal security. If Rio's December 2018 demilitarization was surprising, given the political and institutional incentives that seemingly portended an extension of the original deadline for concluding the Federal Intervention and Operation Rio de Janeiro, then the Army's accrual of power around this time was especially "shocking" (Albertus 2018). The pre-2018 conventional wisdom had been that, despite constituting an influential lobby around non-military policy issues, the Army no longer influenced elections or held cabinet positions as it had during Brazil's democratic transition (e.g., Bruneau and Tollefson 2014; Pion-Berlin and Martínez 2017). Regarding elections, however, in April 2018 Army Commander Gen. Eduardo Villas Bôas tweeted his thinly veiled opposition to the Supreme Federal Tribunal potentially permitting former left-wing president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, imprisoned on corruption charges, to compete in that year's presidential election (Veja 218). One of my interviewees stated that Villas Bôas had "crossed the line" because, by suggesting military interference in the electoral process, the tweet undermined democratic Brazil's nascent norm of civilian control. Another said that

Villas Bôas spoke for the Army [in his tweets]. ... The Army ... has symbolic elements that encourage being reactivated in crises and consider themselves responsible for institutional stability. ... [These elements had surfaced mostly recently when, during the 2016 political crisis around President Dilma Rousseff's impeachment,] Villas Bôas received more politicians at his office than [soon-to-be president] Temer. Politicians knock on the barracks door, too. Politicization [of the military] also is due to civilians.⁸

This quotation illustrates how, contrary to the conventional wisdom of the military no longer trying to influence elections, Villas Bôas' tweet constituted the Army's attempt to accrue power over elections amidst political crises. The quotation also suggests that many politicians were content with the Army having such power. As left-wing politicians rejected what they considered Villas Bôas' threat of military intervention, right-wing politicians like then-congressman and presidential candidate Bolsonaro supported it (Veja 2018). Granted, the tweet occurred only six weeks into the 10-month Federal Intervention, was not related explicitly to militarization, and emerged from the armed forces rather than politicians. Villas Bôas' tweet thus offers not clear evidence of compensation but, rather, suggestive evidence that the Army was poised to demand and, via concessions, to obtain more power beyond internal security from politicians if they decided to order soldiers to get off Rio's streets. Toward October 2018, with the Intervention Observatory discursively delegitimizing militarization and voters preparing to elect Brazil's next president, retired Army leaders also played increasingly influential roles in Bolsonaro's campaign (Brooks and Boadle 2018). Bolsonaro even attributed his election partially to Villas Bôas upon assuming office in January 2019 (Reuters 2019). In sum, while its foray into this decision-making area may not have responded directly to delegitimization and demilitarization, the Army evidently accrued more power around elections as such processes deepened.

Because armed forces' accrual and exercising of power vis-à-vis elections itself can be delegitimizing under democracy, given the norm of civilian control, we might have anticipated a

⁸ I also include this quote in my manuscript, "Identity, Contestation, and Discourse: Increasing Military Power in Brazil", with Douglas Block.

more proportional increase in military power within the public policy decision-making area relative to the demilitarization-driven decrease in power within the internal security area. Indeed, while pre-demilitarization power accrual was particularly evident around elections, post-demilitarization power accrual was evident around public policy. Bolsonaro assumed the presidency on January 1, 2019 with more military leaders in his cabinet than there had been at any time during the military dictatorship (Hunter and Power 2019, 81). That the Army surprisingly withdrew from Rio's streets on December 31, 2018 only to assume unprecedented power over public policy virtually the next day suggests not only that the latter may have been compensation for the former but, also, that the Army had been bargaining with Bolsonaro over the conditions of their withdrawal during the Federal Intervention and Operation Rio de Janeiro. Since January 2018, and especially during the COVID-19 pandemic and its concurrent political crises, the Army's roles in the presidential cabinet and broader Bolsonaro administration only have expanded (Detsch and Saraiva 2021). Such expansive roles signify considerable military power around public policy, further suggesting that politicians may have compensated the Army for the power that, with demilitarization, it was losing around internal security. In short, while this process may have begun before demilitarization, the Army evidently became more powerful around public policy after withdrawing from Rio's streets. My third observable implication and, thus, my overall argument consequently have considerable support with respect to compensation.

Conclusion: Opportunities for continued research

Examining the Brazilian Army's 2018 Federal Intervention and Operation Rio de Janeiro as an illustrative instance of Latin American soldiers' intensifying crimefighting deployments, I have argued that delegitimization is not only a possible consequence of, but, also, a means of controlling the risks of militarization by enabling demilitarization. The dilemma, I have argued, is that this normatively and strategically desirable outcome is conditional on the normatively undesirable outcome of politicians compensating the armed forces with more political power in decision-making areas other than internal security. I have developed this argument by providing evidence of its internal validity through three observable implications. First, broad discourse that constructs militarization as inappropriate for democracy and ineffective for security is necessary and sufficient for the efforts of civilians, especially civil society organizations, to garner robust media coverage and, thus, to constitute the public debate as with the Rio-based Intervention Observatory. Second, such discursive delegitimization precedes demilitarization as evidenced by how, despite politicians' electoral incentives and the Army's institutional incentives favoring keeping soldiers on the streets beyond the initial timeline for withdrawal and despite deployment trends over recent decades, the Federal Intervention and Operation Rio de Janeiro concluded in December 2018 and President Bolsonaro has not deployed soldiers for Rio crimefighting since then. Third, the armed forces accrue more power beyond internal security around the demilitarization period as evidenced by Gen. Villas Bôas' 2018 tweet implicitly threatening the Army's electoral interference, retired Army officials' visible role in the 2018 Bolsonaro campaign, and the Army's influential roles in the Bolsonaro government after 2019. While these findings reveal the stickiness of military power and the fragility of democratic governance, they most importantly underscore how civilian can control militarization by helping delegitimize it.

My argument raises two main questions for continued research. First, regarding internal validity, what else helps delegitimize militarization in Brazil? Although I have addressed alternative explanations by probing hypotheses around media coverage and, less directly, by presenting

Rio's 2018 demilitarization as a meso-level (i.e., institutional) puzzle that discursive delegitimization may help explain, I have not examined historical, macro-level (i.e., national), and micro-level (i.e., individual) factors that may have made crimefighting deployments seem decreasingly legitimate or otherwise may have influenced the Federal Intervention and Operation Rio de Janeiro's conclusion. Analyses that contextualize 2018 Rio within Brazilian civil-military relations, probe key actors' views of appropriateness, security, and power as potential mechanisms linking delegitimization, demilitarization and compensation, and, to a lesser extent, compare Rio's 2018 demilitarization to previous times when the Army's crimefighting deployments in Rio concluded could help fill internal validity gaps. Second, regarding "external validity" (Gerring 2012, 84), how does my argument apply beyond Rio? Like neighboring Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru, Brazil exhibits "limited constabularization of the military" (Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2019, 8) because, as in Rio, politicians geographically and temporally demarcate soldiers' crimefighting deployments. In contrast, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Peru exhibit "generalized constabularization" (8) with enduring and widespread crimefighting deployments. The more that my argument applies in other "limited constabularization" contexts and, notwithstanding the scope difference, in "generalized constabularization", the more confident we can be that, by enabling demilitarization, discursive delegitimization helps civilians control militarization.

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