

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENCE POLICY, DEFENCE BUDGET
AND FORCE STRUCTURE IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL**

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ABSTRACT:

Scholars have explored the challenges and advances in civil-military relations since the creation of the Brazilian Ministry of Defence. However, few have explored this topic in the context of the relationship between policy guidance, defence budget, and force structure in Brazil. To address this problem, it is important to provide an analytical approach that connects defence policy to budget execution in the context of civil-military relations. This paper aims to analyse the relationship between Brazilian defence policy, defence budget, and the current structure of the Armed Forces. This is especially relevant given the tension between disruptive technology implications and the military's traditional roles in Brazilian society. While great power competition is unfolding in South America, the roles, and objectives of the Brazilian military are strongly related to missions other than war. Over the last decade, as internal security challenges in Brazil grew in complexity, civilian political elites pushed the Brazilian Armed Forces to deal with border security, public safety, environmental crimes, and migration crises, among other things. Furthermore, Brazil's military expenditure is characterised by relatively high costs on personnel and low investments, which has detrimental effects on training, operations, and readiness. Nowadays, the debate between 'Presence Strategy' and Conventional Deterrence highlights the existing doubts on how the Brazilian Army, for example, can meet contemporary defence challenges. Our main argument is that personnel expenditure and force structure will be a fundamental issue for Brazilian defence policy in the coming years.

KEYWORDS: National Security; National Defence; Armed Forces; Brazil.

INTRODUCTION

What are the main challenges regarding the relationship between policy guidance, defence budget, and force structure work in Brazil? This is especially relevant given the tension between contemporary implications from emerging disruptive technology contrasted with the military's traditional roles in Brazilian society. The proliferation of emerging technologies on the world stage, best exemplified by the dynamic between force projection *versus* A2/AD, is

an interesting example of the ongoing challenges related to force structure planning and – more important – force employment within the parameters provided by policy guidance and known defence budget restraints.

Furthermore, while great power competition is unfolding in South America, Brazilian military roles and objectives are strongly related to missions other than war. During the last decade, as internal security challenges in Brazil grew in complexity, civilian political elites pushed the Brazilian Armed Forces to deal with issues not related to external defence, such as: border security, public safety, environmental crimes and migration crisis. Furthermore, the Brazilian military expenditure is characterized by relatively high Personnel (79%) and low Equipment procurement costs (13%), which has detrimental effects on training, operations, and readiness.

To address this problem, it is important to provide an analytical approach that connects defence policy to budget execution in the context of civil-military relations. So, using Brazil as a case study we try to identify the main challenges regarding the relationship between policy guidance, defence budget, and force structure in Brazil. In this direction, this paper is organized into four parts. First, the context of civil-military relations in the country is highlighted, exploring the link between the civilian neglect concerning national security policymaking and the process of broadening the national defence concept in Brazilian official documents. Next, we discuss main trends with respect to national security concept and national security policies. In this context, some of the achievements and the challenges of the Brazilian national defence main policies are pointed out. In the third part, we explore the recent geopolitical challenges faced by Brazil, especially the great powers competition and the consequences of the changing strategic landscape due to accelerated technological development. Finally, it is analysed the link between the MD defence budget profile and force structure in Brazil.

1. NATIONAL SECURITY NEGLECT AND THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE CONCEPT IN BRAZIL¹

To analyse the relationship between defence policy, defence budget and force structure in Brazil, it is important to understand first some of the challenges involved, such as: (i) the marginalization of the national security concept in Brazil, (ii) the lack of attention to intelligence matters by civilian political elites after the 1988 Federal Constitution (CF 1988), as well as (iii) the Brazilian' challenges in public safety.

In fact, the military regime had a strong security sector, encompassing defence and security issues in its scope. However, with the end of the military governments (1964-1985) this security sector collapsed whereas several fields of public policies and the very role of the State in Brazil were open to debate in this new moment of the country's political life. Thus,

¹ More details on this specific discussion in Lima, Silva and Rudzit (2021).

broader issues such as the government' regulatory role, governance, governability, and how to promote development also awaited answers on the public agenda (PEREIRA, 1998). Following the establishment of the democratic and constitutional order in Brazil since 1988, it is possible to affirm that discussions on public policies directed to national security, national defence, intelligence, and public safety followed different paths.

First, *national security* practically disappeared from the 1988 Brazilian Constitution. To date, there is only one mention of the term national security in the whole document - and in the specific context of economic activities: 'direct exploitation of economic activities by the State will only be allowed when necessary to national security imperatives or relevant collective interest' (BRASIL, 1988, Art. 173). However, Law No. 7.170 of 14 December 1983, which defines crimes against national security and political and social order, established during the military regime, is still in force today [May 2021] - thirty-eight years later (BRASIL, 1983).

Second, if on the one hand there is only a single mention of *national security* in the 1988 Constitution, on the other hand the word *intelligence* effectively disappeared from the same document. This omission is certainly a result of the role played by the National Intelligence Service (SNI), created in 1964 during the military governments (ANTUNES, 2002). It was only after 1999, with the creation of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) and the Brazilian Intelligence System (SISBIN - Sistema Brasileiro de Inteligência), that the intelligence field gained a clearer direction. Even so, several challenges remain in this area. Cepik (2003, p. 207), for example, notes that the very definition of intelligence activity in the law that created ABIN and SISBIN was 'excessively vague'. The National Intelligence Policy (PNI) announced in the same Law 9.883/1999 (BRASIL, 1999a, Art. 5) was only established in 2016, that is, seventeen years later (BRASIL, 2016a). Similarly, the external control body for intelligence activity announced in Law 9883/1999 (BRASIL, 1999a, Art. 6), was only created in 2013 - fourteen years later (BRASIL, 2013). Finally, it is important to highlight that the crime of terrorism, , was only regulated in 2016 - twenty-eight years after it was defined in the 1988 Federal Constitution (BRASIL, 2016b).

Finally, according to the 1988 Federal Constitution, public safety became the responsibility of 27 federative units in Brazil: 26 states and the Federal District (BRASIL, 1988, Art. 144). In each subnational state, there are a civilian and a 'military' police, both subordinated to a state governor. For example, at the federal level, it is important to highlight the substantial role played in public safety by the Federal Police (PF - Polícia Federal) and the Federal Highway Police (PRF - Polícia Rodoviária Federal), especially regarding drug trafficking and in the fight against corruption. In face of an complex Brazilian judicial and criminal system, coordination in the field of public safety has become a major challenge. To address this, three initiatives can be highlighted: (i) the creation, in 1997, of the National Secretariat of Public Safety (SENASP - Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública); (ii) the establishment, in 2007, of the National Program of Public Safety with Citizenship (PRONASCI - Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania) (BRASIL, 2007); and (iii) the creation, in 2018, of the National Policy of Public Security and Social Defence (PNSPDS - Política Nacional de

Segurança Pública e Defesa Social) and the Unified System of Public Security (SUSP - Sistema Único de Segurança Pública) (BRASIL, 2018a). Undoubtedly, these initiatives were not enough to reduce the problems in Brazilian public safety, as illustrated by, for example, the federal intervention, in 2018, in the public security of the state of Rio de Janeiro (BRASIL, 2018b) and the police operation conducted against drug trafficking in the Jacarezinho favela, in 2021, considered the operation with the highest number of deaths in the last 16 years (REUTERS, 2021).

This synthesis helps to understand why broader issues at the level of national security, intelligence and public safety ended up becoming specific challenges of the national defence field, reflecting on the role of the Brazilian Armed Forces in the State and society (SILVA, 2019). In the second part of this paper such challenges will be deepened, but in synthesis it is possible to say that the roots of much of such issues lie in civilian neglect regarding national security policymaking, as well as the military resistance to broader defence reforms:

...since democratisation in 1985, civilian elites have neglected national security policymaking and the military has since maintained several military prerogatives. Instead, as internal security challenges grew in complexity, civilian political elites pushed the military to deal with public safety, border security, and national security policymaking (LIMA; SILVA; RUDZIT, 2020).

As it will be possible to see in the second part of this paper, this civilian neglect concerning national security policymaking contributes to the process of broadening the national defence concept in Brazilian official documents, against the post-Cold War international literature on security and defence, as well against the trends in national security and defence policymaking. Lima and Medeiros Filho (2018, p. 13) will call this process as ‘the enlargement of national defence concept’, that is, ‘in the absence of mechanisms, institutions and supra-sectorial directions to address the country's strategic issues, such themes were inserted in the scope of the national defence sector’.

2. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICIES IN BRAZIL

As discussed below, the process of enlargement of the national defence concept clashes with the post-Cold War international literature on security and defence, as against the trends in national security and defence policy making.

First, the very concept of security, in general, has undergone changes, being broadened and deepened:

The traditional, state-centric understanding of security has gradually given way in recent years to what is widely referred to as the new

security agenda. The new security agenda recognises the wide range of state and non-state actors that can act as security providers—or in some instances, as purveyors of insecurity. It also takes a broad view of security, understanding national security not only in military terms but also in terms of political, social, economic and environmental security. In this context, SSR [Security Sector Reform] should be understood as encompassing both the protection of the state and the wellbeing of its citizens (DCAF, 2012, p. 3).

Thus, after the end of Berlin Wall, national defence began to be understood as a sub-element of the broader security framework and its problems (LOUTH; TAYLOR, 2019, p. 27), because defence ‘cannot provide for security alone and that it can only be a part of the overall response of government’ (DORMAN; KAUFMAN, 2014, p. 283). In other words, as Chile's 2017 White Paper sums up well, defence has come to be understood as a more specific concept linked to the armed forces and military security:

Although defence and security are closely related, defence is a more specific concept than security, referring to the development and employment of military and employment of military capabilities for tasks defined by the Constitution and laws. Defence alone does not produce the desired condition of security, but it is undoubtedly one of the essential factors in obtaining it (CHILE, 2017, p. 102)

Therefore, the concept of national security became increasingly linked with human security, in which the society and the individuals are, basically, free from fear, free from want and able to live in dignity to advance their way of life (UN, 2016).

Second, mainly due to this process of broadening and deepening the security concept in recent decades several countries have adopted national security policies/strategies (see Table 1), that is, here basically understood as ‘an official description of how a state aims to provide for its own security and that of its population’, linked with more specific defence documents. In general terms, a national security policy provides an understanding of national interests (or objectives), values, principles, threats perceptions, governance mechanisms, decision-making processes, and usually culminates in a long-term vision of State and human security in the future (DCAF, 2015).

Examples - National Security Policies (2013-2021)		
Country	Year	Title
Spain	2013	Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional 2013
	2017	Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional 2017
Australia	2016	2016 Defence White Paper
Germany	2016	White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr
France	2013	French White Paper on Defence and National Security
	2017	Defence and National Security Strategic Review 2017
Canada	2017	Canada's defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged
Norway	2017	Setting the course for Norwegian foreign and security policy
Sweden	2017	National Security Strategy
Poland	2020	National Security Strategy
United States	2017	National Security Strategy
	2018	National Defense Strategy
	2021	Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
United Kingdom	2015	The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review
	2021	Global Britain in a Competitive Age, the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy
	2021	Defence in a Competitive Age

Source: Table 1 - the authors.

In Brazil, there are currently three main documents defining the directions of the national defence area: the National Defence Policy (PND), the National Defence Strategy (END) and the National Defence White Paper (LBDN). These three (theoretically) four-year documents were only possible due to the first National Defence Strategy (END), published in 2008. The 2008 END is considered the first effective defence policy following the end of the Military Regime and the creation of the Brazilian Ministry of Defence in 1999. Not only the first "National Defence Policy" (PDN - 1996), but also the second one (PDN - 2005), were known among some Brazilian academics and military officers as excessively general for a defence policy (OLIVEIRA, 2009).

The focus of the 2008 END was on the required medium to long term strategic actions, as well as on the modernization of the national defence structure in terms of three 'axes': (a) reorganization of the Brazilian Armed Forces, (b) restructuring of the Brazilian defence industrial base, and (c) the troop requirements policy for the Armed Forces. In addition, three 'strategic sectors' were chosen and later allocated, respectively, to each military branch: (i) nuclear (Brazilian Navy), (ii) cybernetics (Brazilian Army), and (iii) space (Brazilian Air Force). Curiously, at the same time that these efforts were established in order to modernize the Brazilian defence structure, the END explicitly included the guideline to maintain conscription system, stating that 'the objective to be gradually pursued is to make military service really mandatory' (BRASIL, 2008).

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (EMCFA - Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas) was created by Law 136/2010, but this new organization was established at the same level as the three military commands (Navy, Army and Air Force). This same law defined the Executive Branch's obligation to submit updates of the PND, END and LBDN to the National Congress every four years, starting in 2012.

The main problem is that this quadrennial guideline has not evolved as expected. The updated PND, END, and LBDN have been approved with delays, as well as facing limitations in the consultation and drafting phase (e.g. independent non-government experts, parliamentary committees etc.). The 2012 PND, END, and LBDN were approved one year later (Legislative Decree no. 373/2013) and the 2016 versions were approved only in 2018 (Legislative Decree no. 179/2018). Finally, the 2020 editions of the same documents were sent to the National Congress in July 2020 and so far, await evaluation [May 2021].

Given this background, it can be observed that successive Brazilian governments have insisted on elaborating and implementing separate policies for the areas of intelligence (National Intelligence Policy, PNI - 2016), national defence (PND, END, and LBDN - 2012, 2016, and 2020) and public safety (National Policy for Public Security and Social Defence, PNSPDS - 2018). Besides this fragmentation of public policies in the field of national security, there are still two major challenges for defence policy: the growing geopolitical challenges in Brazil's area of influence and the unpredictability of its defence budget.

3. BRAZILIAN GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES²

Features of classical geopolitics reappear in contemporary international politics, namely: great power competition, containment strategies, counter-containment, and hard balancing. The changing pattern of polarity in the 21st century, increasingly closer to multipolarity, is accompanied by the redrawing of the international chessboard under the tints of geopolitics and geostrategy. In it, the United States, China, and Russia are once again representatives of long-lasting lines in world geo-history. Great power struggle emerges once again as the engine that moves the remaking of geopolitics in the present century.

Despite its marginal condition in global affairs, these international political processes spill over to South America, incorporating the region as part of a broader geostrategic chessboard. In this scenario, South America is affected by the great power rivalry, notably the United States, China, and Russia (TEIXEIRA JÚNIOR, 2018).

The geopolitical dispute over Eurasia by the great powers produces responses and adaptations in the field of national and military strategy. To contain and accommodate regional balances of power, the United States reinforces its projection and presence on the two fringes of Eurasia. Seeking regain its position and recognition as a great power, Russia acts to halt the

² More details on this specific discussion in Teixeira Júnior (2018, 2019, and 2020).

reduction of its sphere of influence. For this purpose, the construction of a polycentric world is fundamental. In East Asia, China's emergence as a territorially dominant power is based on the transformation of its economy and society, but also on the reformulation of its military capabilities. As can be seen in Figure 1, the association between the grand strategy objectives and power struggle has produced the effect of projecting great power competition beyond their immediate spheres of influence.




Figure 1 - 'Containment and Counter-Containment Strategies and Spaces' **Source:** the authors, based on 'The World with Commanders' Areas of Responsibility', edition 9 NGA, Series 1107. Available at: https://archive.defense.gov/news/UCP_2011_Map4.pdf . Access on: May 21, 2021.

Thus, traditionally distant from the main tension hotspots, the area known as the 'Brazilian strategic surroundings' (*entorno estratégico brasileiro*) (see Figure 2) is undergoing a process of reconfiguration of its role as a board in contemporary geopolitics. As displayed in Figure 1, Brazil's strategic surroundings is becoming a horizon for both power projection and containment. For countries such as China and Russia, South America and Brazil are functionally inserted in the geostrategic dynamic as a space for diversionary manoeuvres to reduce the weight and pressure of the US in Eurasia (TEIXEIRA JÚNIOR, 2020). In this context, South America becomes an area for geostrategic struggle in which the Brazil may see its autonomy and the prospects of building of a regional order threatened.



Figure 2 - 'Expansion of Brazil's Geopolitical Projection' **Source:** the authors, based on Travassos (1935), Silva (1967), Meira Mattos (2002), and Fiori (2013).

Given Brazil's withdrawal from the international scene in the last years (CERVO & LESSA, 2014) and the accelerated process of penetration in the region by great extra-regional powers (TEIXEIRA JÚNIOR, 2020), it is necessary to rethink Brazil's armed forces. Since the first version of the National Defence Strategy (END 2008) set the mission of raising the standards of the Brazilian Armed Forces, each branch presented its own idea of military change: the Navy prioritized modernization, the Army opted for transformation, and the Air Force adopted a reorganization program. Although it is unclear whether, and how, the Ministry of Defence (MD) carries out effective control and coordination of these processes, the fact is that each branch has distinct ideas of what military change means and how it should be carried out.

Considered as Brazil's main military branch, the Brazilian Army has its own concept of transformation, working as an important guideline for thinking, planning, and pursuing its

future force structure. As seen in the National Defence White Paper (LBDN), in recent years the Army and other branches are learning from ongoing experiences in transformation, modernization, and military reforms.

The broader context of geopolitical competition contributes to changes in military strategy and doctrine. As McCoy (2017) notes, the incorporation of geographic dimensions of warfare into new domains of operations has produced changes in doctrine and in operational concepts. There is a growing awareness in Brazil about the importance of issues such as major weapon systems development, the imperative of interoperability in contemporary military operations, and how the restructuring of defence and armed forces decisively impacts on the country's deterrence calculus. Broader changes in military technology and its impacts on tactics and doctrine spills over to the Brazilian defence debate, especially the idea of Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD).

Originally thought as a strategy to limit the United States' freedom of force projection by countries such as China and Russia (KREPINEVICH, WATTS & WORD, 2003), A2/AD seems to be even more relevant when there is a notable asymmetry in the military balance. A2/AD can be considered as a strategy or operational concept that brings together anti-access and area denial capabilities. Anti-Access is defined as the ability to stop the force projection (access of expeditionary forces) of an opponent into an area or a contested region (e.g. a theatre of operations). Area denial is understood as the ability to degrade or denial movement and manoeuvre opportunities of an enemy within a contested region (TANGREDI, 2013).

Their effects unfold at all domains of operations (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace). A2/AD strategies also encompass irregular means and actions. For this reason, the range of means and weapon systems characterised as components of A2/AD strategies is varied, from conventional options, such as anti-aircraft defence and submarines, to irregular ones, such as the use of proxies or mercenaries, or non-kinetic means, such as electronic warfare and actions in the informational field (e.g. psychological and information operations) (SIMON, 2017; FREIER, 2012). This debate becomes even more relevant when considered the rapid advance of disruptive technologies, such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic, space technologies, quantum technologies, big data, cybernetics etc. (NATO, 2020).

Despite the geopolitical and technological developments, the prolonged period of political, economic, and social crisis, accompanied by Brazil's international downturn (CERVO & LESSA, 2014), casts doubt on which objectives military transformation will serve. After all, which scenario for force employment will prove prevalent in the coming years: fighting organised crime or preparing for conventional war and warfare in the face of geostrategic competition in Brazil's area of influence? Both options are legitimate, but they entail distinct force design and developments, as well as resource allocation. Given the complexity of the challenges and of contemporary military power, it is increasingly difficult to operate with effectiveness in all spectrums of operations.

Even though Brazil's defence management model can guarantee a high level of autonomy and bargaining space between the three military branches, international experiences demonstrate that this model is inept to promote proper military change. The debate, for example, between 'Presence Strategy' (especially in the Amazon region) and Conventional Deterrence highlights the existing doubts on how the current doctrinal and strategic pillars of the Brazilian Army can meet contemporary defence challenges. Countries such as the US, Russia and China make it clear that military transformation cannot be produced with one military branch alone, but through the slow development of a joint force, characterized by a high degree of interoperability and capable of operating with synergy in all areas and dimensions of war (TEIXEIRA JÚNIOR, 2019). This is even more challenging when analysing the dynamics of the Brazilian defence budget, as discussed below.

4. THE (DES)CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DEFENSE BUDGET PROFILE AND FORCE STRUCTURE IN BRAZIL

As discussed in the previous section, the uncertainties of the global geopolitical chessboard and of the rapid technological advances are demanding quick responses from national security and defence organizations, with clear repercussions for the armed forces, defence industry and national military budgets.


In general, national defence budgets have three essential categories: (i) personnel costs (e.g. regular forces, reservists and military, as well civilian pensions payments); (ii) research, development and procurement of defence equipment; and (iii) training, exercises, operations and maintenance. NATO member countries, for example, have adopted two main goals: (i) allocating 2% of GDP to national defence, serving as an indicator of a country's political will to contribute to NATO's common defence efforts, and (ii) at least 20% of defence expenditures devoted to major equipment procurement (e.g. aircraft, tanks, frigates, submarines, communication systems etc.), including their associated costs. NATO's 20% guideline is generally perceived as a crucial indicator for the scale and pace of modernisation, because 'where expenditures fail to meet the 20% guideline, there is an increasing risk of equipment becoming obsolete, growing capability and interoperability gaps among Allies, and a weakening of Europe's defence industrial and technological base' (NATO, 2021a). To this end, NATO member states have been spending, on average, 51% of their defence budget on Personnel, although with problems. Croatia (HRV, 71.7%) and Greece (GRC, 75.6%), for example, are the countries that spent the most on Personnel in 2020 (NATO, 2021b).

While not all NATO members succeed in meeting these two goals (see Table 2), other countries have also sought to allocate more resources to Equipment. China, for example, according to official data, spent 33,2% of its military budget on Equipment and 34,9% in Personnel expense in 2010. That same figure in 2017 rose respectively to 41,1% and 30,8% (CHINA, 2019, p. 39).

US Dollars - Constant 2015 prices and exchange rates (2018)							
		Const. 2015	% GDP	EQUIPMENT	PERSONNEL	OTHER (O&M)	INFRASTR.
1	USA	642,012	3.30	27.06	39.28	32.49	1.17
2	UK	64,978	2.13	22.19	33.82	41.00	2.99
3	FRANCE	46,573	1.82	23.66	46.90	25.92	3.51
4	GERMANY	44,567	1.24	12.36	47.99	35.49	4.15
5	ITALY	23,058	1.21	21.12	65.66	11.30	1.92
6	CANADA	21,596	1.31	11.94	51.02	33.46	3.58


Table 2. **Source:** based on ‘Table 2 : Defence expenditure - Million US dollars’. Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013-2019). November, 29. Available at: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_11/20191129_pr-2019-123-en.pdf . Access on 15 May 2021.

According to the SIPRI military database, several countries in South America (e.g. Colombia, 3.4% in 2020) spend more on defence as a percentage of GDP than Brazil (1.4% in 2020) (see Graph 1).



Graph 1. **Source:** SIPRI Military Expenditure Database - Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross domestic product, 1949-2020. Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> . Access on 15 May 2021.

Nonetheless, the size of the Brazilian economy and its military spending are much higher compared to Colombia's. In 2019, for example, Brazil ranked 9th among the world's largest GDP (US\$ 1,839,758 millions) and there is no South American country among the 15 largest GDPs in the globe. Colombia, for example, ranked 39th position (US\$ 323,616 millions) (WORLD BANK, 2021). Regarding military spending, in 2020, Brazil ranked 15th among the world's largest military expenditures (US\$ 19.7 billion or 1.4% of GDP). Colombia, for example, in the same year, ranked 26th (US\$ 9.2 billion or 3.4% of GDP) (SILVA; TIAN; MARKSTEINER, 2021). With one of the highest military expenditures among South American countries, Brazil presents a stable level of military spending around 1.5% of GDP since 1988 (see Graph 2). Therefore, in terms of "national effort", Brazilian total military spending is indeed significant and stable, especially in the last two decades.



Graph 2. **Source:** SIPRI Military Expenditure Database - Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross domestic product, 1949-2020. Available at: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> . Access on 15 May 2021.

When it comes to the Brazilian defence budget traditional profile, it can be seen, for example, that in 2019 the country spent 79.7% (R\$ 14,6 billion) of all its defence spending (R\$ 111 billion or 1,53% of GDP) on Personnel and only 13.1% on Investments (R\$ 14,6 billion), that is, the specific part dedicated to military strategic projects (see Figure 3).



Figure 3. **Source:** Ministério da Defesa. Available at: <https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/assuntos/orcamento-e-financas-1/orcamento-e-financas-1>. Access on 15 May 2021.

Considering that only the most important Brazilian military projects alone (PROSUB, Guarani, Astros 2020, Sisfron, FX-2, KC 390, and H-X BR) demand about R\$ 83 billion until 2041 (see Figure 4), it is possible to say that this budgetary profile, characterized by high expenses in Personnel (2019: 79.7%) and low Investments (2019: 13.1%), will be a major challenge of Brazilian national defence sector in the coming years.



Figure 4. **Source:** BRAGA NETTO, Walter Souza. Apresentação pública na Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional (CREDN) da Câmara dos Deputados, 5 de maio de 2021. Available at: <https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes->

[permanentes/credn/apresentacoes-em-eventos/apresentacoes-de-convidados-em-eventos-de-2021-oculta/05-05-audiencia-publica-md-e-comandantes/md](https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-permanentes/credn/apresentacoes-em-eventos/apresentacoes-de-convidados-em-eventos-de-2021-oculta/05-05-audiencia-publica-md-e-comandantes/md) . Access on 15 May 2021.

For example, in 2021 the amounts needed to guarantee only the ongoing contracts of its main strategic projects totalled R\$8.7 billion, but the military received approximately half (49%) that amount (R\$4.2 billion) (see Figure 5).



Figure 5. **Source:** BRAGA NETTO, Walter Souza. Apresentação pública na Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional (CREDN) da Câmara dos Deputados, 5 de maio de 2021. Available at: <https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-permanentes/credn/apresentacoes-em-eventos/apresentacoes-de-convidados-em-eventos-de-2021-oculta/05-05-audiencia-publica-md-e-comandantes/md> . Access on 15 May 2021.

In practice, this fragile situation means that each year there are fewer resources to maintain the approximately 366,500 active military personnel (Army: 214,000, Navy: 85,000 and Air Force: 67,500) at adequate levels of readiness. Alternatively, this data enforces the trends towards a prevalent option for missions other than war, traditionally manpower intensive and in line with the country's strategic culture (e. g. 'Presence Strategy').

Given this framework, the MD foresees a reduction of 10% of the Armed Forces' personnel in a 10-year period, which will hardly solve by itself the problem of the mismatch between personnel and equipment expenditures (SCHREIBER, 2019). On the other hand, the EMCFA has invested in the implementation of the Capability-Based Planning (CBP) methodology in the Armed Forces (BRASIL, 2019), which also represents a significant challenge, since, by Law 97/1999 (the same which created MD), the Navy, the Army and the

Air Force manage individually the budgetary resources allocated to them in the budget of the Ministry of Defence.

A possible first step to change this situation would be to do in Brazil what the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) did in the United States, such as (i) to strengthen the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CEMCFA), 'in order for him to be able to provide vital, objective, independent military advice' to the Brazilian Defence Minister and the President; (ii) to create the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and (iii) to reinforce 'the concept of jointness, especially with respect to the careers of senior officers, by requiring them to gain professional experience outside of their service in order to advance further in their careers' (CARTER, 2016; LOTHER, 2004).

CONCLUSIONS

The objective of this paper was to analyse the relationship between Brazilian defence policy, defence budget, and the current structure of the Armed Forces. More specifically, the aim was to discuss the main challenges of this relationship. To tackle this problem, we tested an analytical approach connecting defence policy to budget execution in the context of civil-military relations. Mainly, our analyses shed light on the effects of civilian neglect in defence policy and its consequences in force structure in a challenging geopolitical landscape.

In the first part, we explored the link between the civilian neglect concerning national security policymaking and the process of broadening the national defence concept in Brazilian official documents. This background helped to explore some trends with respect to national security concept and national security policies. We conclude that the successive Brazilian governments have insisted on elaborating and implementing separate policies for the areas of intelligence (National Intelligence Policy, PNI - 2016), national defence (PND, END, and LBDN - 2012, 2016, and 2020) and public safety (National Policy for Public Security and Social Defence, PNSPDS - 2018), instead to follow the international trend to elaborate an integrated national security policy.

Given the geopolitical challenges and the revival of the great power competition, even though Brazil's defence management model can guarantee a high level of autonomy and bargaining space between the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force, international experiences demonstrate that this model is inept to promote proper military change. This is relevant when considering the fast pace of disruptive technologies, such as AI, hypersonic, space technologies, quantum technologies, big data, cybernetics etc

We also have shown that not only has Brazil stood out as one of the world's largest economies and as having one of the highest military expenditures in the world, but it has also presented a stable level of military spending around 1.5% of GDP since 1988. Therefore, in terms of "national effort", Brazilian military spending is indeed significant and relatively stable,

especially in the last two decades. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that this budgetary profile, characterized by high expenses in Personnel (2019: 79.7%), low Investments (2019: 13.1%), and low Operations and Maintenance expenditure (2019: 5.5%) will be a major challenge of Brazilian national defence sector in the coming years. This budgetary profile means that there are fewer resources each year to maintain the approximately 366,500 active military personnel at adequate levels of readiness.

In this direction, our main argument is that Personnel expenditure and force structure will be a fundamental issue for Brazilian defence policy in the coming years. The most promising way out for this situation seems to be the successful implementation of the Capability-Based Planning (CBP) methodology in the Armed Forces. But even this alternative also represents a significant challenge, since, by Law 97/1999, the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force manage individually the budgetary resources allocated to them in the budget of the Ministry of Defence. In this context, a possible first step to modify this situation would be to do in Brazil what the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) did in the United States, such as strengthening the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CEMCF) and, for example, requiring that senior officers gain professional experience outside of their military branches to advance further in their careers. However, without active civilian control of the military and clear policy guidance, bureaucratic insulation or autonomy shall prevail over the needed reforms towards a modern and democratic security and defence sectors in contemporary Brazil.

DISCLAIMER

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the Brazilian government.

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